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I. INTRODUCTION
The American farm economy is in its worst financial condition
since the 1930s. Plummeting land values, low crop prices, and high
interest rates have put farmers and agricultural creditors in a financial
squeeze. As farm incomes have declined, and as the security position
of farm lenders has deteriorated, farm foreclosures and bankruptcies
have increased to levels not seen since the Great Depression. Farmers
have tried, largely in vain, to reorganize under chapter 11 of the fed-
eral Bankruptcy Code. This led to the enactment of a new family
farmer bankruptcy option, chapter 12 bankruptcy reorganization, in
1986. Many farmers facing financial difficulty have now been given
the option of having a farm reorganization plan confirmed under chap-
ter 12. Whether this will lead to the ultimate survival of the reorga-
nized family farm enterprise remains to be seen.
* B.A. Hastings College, 1972; J.D. George Washington University, 1975; Associate
Professor of Agricultural Economics (Water & Agricultural Law Specialist), Uni-
versity of Nebraska-Lincoln.
t Research support for preparation of this article was provided by the Nebraska
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FAMILY FARMER BANKRUPTCY
Although farm real estate values appear to be stabilizing,1 the cur-
rent financial difficulties facing farmers are not likely to abate soon.
Federal farm program payments have become highly controversial,
and are scheduled for annual reductions to the year 1990.2 These re-
ductions in farm program payments will be reflected in reduced farm
income for cash grain farmers. Long-term predictions indicate that
the promise of dramatically increased agricultural productivity
through biotechnology may exacerbate the current overproduction
problem of farm commodities.3 If current estimates on the impact of
biotechnology on farming are anywhere close to being accurate, the
resulting financial upheaval will make the current financial difficul-
ties seem mild. Thus farm bankruptcies are, and probably will con-
tinue to be a significant part of the rural landscape. Any rural
practitioner, whether he or she engages in bankruptcy practice or not,
must become conversant with the fundamentals of farm bankruptcies.
This article surveys the bankruptcy options available to farmers,
including the legal developments leading to enactment of chapter 12.
Part II discusses the farm economy, describing the land boom of the
1. B. JOHNSON & R. HANSON, DEP'T OF AGRIC. ECONOMICS, UNIV. OF NEBRASKA,
REPT. No. 151, NEBRASKA FARM REAL ESTATE M&ARKEr DEVELOPMENTS (1987)
(hereinafter REAL ESTATE DEVELOPMENTS)
2. See Comment, Gramm-Rudman-Hollings and the Farm Bilf: Solution or Suicide
Pact?, 31 S.D.L.Rev. 541, 545 (1986). Under the original Gramm-Rudman debt re-
duction statute agricultural programs would have been required to take a 17.7%
budget reduction to meet a 4.3% federal deficit reduction goal. Even though pro-
visions of the original Gramm-Rudman federal debt reduction statute are likely
to be modified, agricultural programs still will probably be disproportionately re-
duced to help balance the budget, due primarily to agriculture's waning political
clout.
3. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, REPT. No. OTA-F-285,
TECHNOLOGY, PUBLIC POLICY, AND THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN AG-
RICULTURE (1986) (hereinafter TECHNOLOGY, POLICY AND STRUCTURE). OTA esti-
mates that the total number of farms will fall 44% from 1982 to 2000. The number
of small farms (up to $99,000 in annual gross sales) will fall 48%, the number of
moderate sized farms ($100,000 to $199,000 in annual gross sales) will fall 58%,
while the number of large farms (at least $200,000 in annual gross sales) will in-
crease 44%. Adjusting the decline in the number of moderate sized farms for
those that will become large farms, the net decline is still 29%. Id. at 9. (derived
from table 1.2). This reduction in the number of total farms will continue the
already high current rate of farmers leaving agriculture involuntarily.
Operators of small and moderate-sized farms, the so-called backbone of
American agriculture, are becoming increasingly less able to compete,
partly because they lack access to the information and finances [sic] nec-
essary for adopting the new [agricultural production] technologies effec-
tively. Many such farmers must relocate, change to other kinds of
farming, or give up farming altogether. The disappearance of these farm
operations is causing repercussions for other businesses in the rural com-
munity and for the [national] labor pool in general, which must absorb
all those whose livelihood once depend on agricultural production.
Id. at 3.
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late 1970s, the succeeding bust in the 1980s, and their impact on farm-
ers and farm lenders. Part III discusses the legal options available to
farmers and farm creditors when the farm loan is in default. Particu-
lar attention is paid to the bankruptcy options available to farmers
prior to chapter 12, and the particular features of chapter 11 and chap-
ter 13 bankruptcies that made farm reorganizations difficult. Part IV
provides a brief legislative history of chapter 12, discussing the Con-
gressional reaction to the failure of farmers to obtain bankruptcy reor-
ganization relief. Part V discusses chapter 12, including an analysis of
how to prepare a chapter 12 reorganization plan.
II. FARM LENDING AND THE FARM ECONOMY
The current problems in agriculture are in part a response to the
farmland boom beginning in the early 1970s. Poor worldwide harvests
in 1972 and 1974 led Russia to enter the international market in 1976,
sending already high crop prices soaring.4 The high crop prices con-
tributed to a rise in farm real estate values.5 Other factors contribut-
ing to land boom include inflation, tax shelter opportunities in
agriculture, and optimism regarding continued high crop prices. Agri-
cultural spokesmen, including President Nixon's Secretary of Agri-
culture Earl Butz, encouraged American farmers to produce
"fencerow to fencerow" for the export market.6 However, crop prices
started to decline in the late 1970s, due in part to increased foreign
4. J. WESSEL, TRADING THE FUTURE ch. 2 (1983). Cash corn prices increased from
$1.18 in 1972 to $1.78 in 1973, a 51% annual increase. Cash corn prices increased
again to $2.79 in 1974, a 56% annual increase, and a 136% increase over two years.
The large drop in crop prices occurred in 1977, when cash corn prices fell from
$2.42 to $1.97, a 19% annual decline, and a 29% decline from the 1974 peak. DEP'T
OF AGRIC. ECONOMICS, UNIV. OF NEBRASKA, REPT. No. 150, CROP AND LIVESTOCK
PRICES FOR NEBRASKA PRODUCERS (1987). Similar price increases and decreases
occurred for soybeans and wheat. Id.
5. The following table indicates the annual percentage changes in Nebraska farm-
land values:
Year Change Year Change Year Change
1970 -5.4% 1976 18.7% 1982 - 11.8%
1971 -2.1% 1977 8.1% 1983 -13.6%
1972 3.1% 1978 -9.5% 1984 -15.0%
1973 9.9% 1979 14.4% 1985 -30.5%
1974 18.8% 1980 5.3% 1986 -20.8%
1975 5.1% 1981 -0.3% 1987 -10.3%
REAL ESTATE DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 1, at 40. The land boom began in 1973
and ended in 1982. The real price of average Nebraska farmland (adjusted for
inflation increased 91% from 1972 to 1981, and declined 68% from 1981 to 1987. Id.
The real value of Nebraska farmland is now 61% of its 1972 pre-boom value. Re-
garding the relationship between crop prices and farm values, see also Harl, The
Architecture of Public Policy: The Crisis in Agriculture, 34 KAN.L.REV. 425, 431-
32 (1986).
6. J. ANDERSON & J. MORRIS, CHAPTER 12 FARM REORGANIZATIONS § 1.02 n. 21
(1987).
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agricultural production, and high world-wide interest rates. Real es-
tate value declines started in 1981, attributable in part to falling world
crop prices and high interest rates from the Reagan administration's
anti-inflation policy.
The rising crop and land prices of the early 1970s along with the
economic promise of producing for the new farm export market made
farmers and farm lenders bullish regarding agriculture's prospects.
Farmers, eager to expand, used the steadily increasing land values to
finance that expansion. Farm lenders were similarly eager to lend,
taking land with its steadily increasing values as collateral.7 When
crop prices started to decline in 1977, farm operating losses resulted.
However, most lenders were still oversecured (collateral value signifi-
cantly exceeded loan balance) as land prices were still rising, and lend-
ers were willing to extend the loan. The continuing inflation in land
values covered questionable loans: even if the farming operation did
not show a positive cash flow the lender was protected on paper so
long as collateral values continued to increase annually. At this time
most farmers and lenders probably expected that the turndown in
farm prices was temporary, so lenders were willing to carry farmers
so long as they were oversecured. Hindsight shows that this optimistic
expectation was incorrect. As land values began to decline, lenders'
policies became more conservative, particularly as their security posi-
tion changed from oversecured to only adequately secured to in many
cases undersecured (collateral value less than loan balance).
To better understand how these macroeconomic developments af-
fected agricultural finance, one needs to understand farm credit prac-
tices. Generally a farmer will have a single operating lender, a bank or
Production Credit Association (PCA) which supplies the farmer an
operating line of credit.8 In return for this credit the lender will have
encumbered all or most of the farm assets. Thus, the farmer's operat-
ing lender will normally have the first secured position on all prop-
erty. If the farmer had expanded during the land boom, his real estate
7. The major value of all farm assets, including crops, livestock, equipment, and
land, is in real estate. In 1981, the peak of the farmland boom, real estate consti-
tuted 71% of total farm assets. In 1987, after farmland values had fallen by 68%,
real estate still constituted 60% of all farm assets. REAL ESTATE DEVELOPMENTS,
supra note 1, at 5.
8. In 1984 commercial banks extended 51% of the non-real estate farm credit in
Nebraska, the Commodity Credit Corporation 17%, trade creditors 16%, Produc-
tion Credit Associations 10%, and the Farmer's Home Administration 6%. Credit
extended through these operating loans totaled $6 billion. In the last decade the
proportion of bank and PCA lending declined, government (CCC and FmHA)
lending increased, and dealer lending was largely unchanged. In 1974 the distri-
bution of farm debt secured by personal property was banks 62%, PCAs 19%,
trade creditors 17%, CCC 1%, and FmHA 1%. Credit extended totaled $2 billion.
U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, ECONOMIC INDICATORS OF THE FARM SECTOR, March
1984, 221, 241 (1986).
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lender would have first priority on the land securing the expansion
debt. Conventional farm real estate lenders include the Federal Land
Bank, insurance companies, and private individuals (i.e. landowners
financing the sale of their land on a contract for deed).9 During the
1970s boom in farmland prices, some farmers borrowed against their
rising land values to expand their operations through equipment and
land purchases. These purchases were included in the farmer's oper-
ating line of credit rather than being set up on a conventional interme-
diate term note. This led to cash flow problems as farmers had
financed intermediate asset acquisition on a short term basis. Before
land prices began to fall many farmers received no credit from trade
suppliers (seed, feed, chemical, and fuel suppliers). The trade suppli-
ers were generally paid by the farmer prior to harvest with funds ad-
vanced by operating lender. The operating loan was paid in turn when
the crop was harvested and marketed.
When farmers started developing operating losses and began carry-
ing an operating deficit, most lenders continued to carry the loan so
long as they were oversecured. As land values started their rapid de-
cline, and as it became clear that crop prices would not rebound, the
operating lender's position became more precarious. Lenders began
cutting the farmer's operating line of credit off when the loan was in
default. Lenders did not necessarily foreclose, however, because their
after acquired property clause gave them first lien on future crops
even with no further credit advances if the farmer could find other
operating financing. If the farmer continued to operate, it was often
due to credit extended by trade suppliers who may have mistakenly
believed they had the first security position on the new crop. In fact,
a trade creditor's security interest would come ahead of the operating
lender's prior security interest and after acquired property clause only
if the original loan was in default at least six months prior to the
planting of the new crop.10 Trade creditors were rarely secured. If
they did obtain a security interest, they generally were subject to the
operating lender's after acquired property clause.11
9. In 1984 Federal Land Banks extended 42% of the farm real credit secured by
estate, individuals 26% (largely through seller financed land contracts), insurance
companies 16%, Farmer's Home Administration 10%, and banks 6%. Credit ex-
tended totaled $4.3 billion. Land contract financing and insurance company lend-
ing declined, while land bank credit increased over the last decade. In 1974 the
distribution of farm real estate debt was individuals 43%, land banks 24%, insur-
ance companies 20%, FmHA 9%, and banks 3%. Credit extended totaled $1.5 bil-
lion. Id. at 220, 240.
10. NEB. REV. STAT. (U.C.C.) § 9-312(2) (Cum. Supp. 1986).
11. Unsecured creditors took some steps to improve their status through trade sup-
plier lien statutes. Legislation in 1977 established crop liens in favor of those pro-
viding fertilizers, soil conditioners, or agricultural chemicals or applying such
products. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 52-1101 to 1104 (1984 & 1986 Cum.Supp.). See Circle
76 Fertilizer v. Nelson, 219 Neb. 661, 365 N.W.2d 460 (1985). In 1985, similar legis-
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In some cases the farmer and lender were able to restructure the
farmer's debt through a "workout"; essentially a privately negotiated
financial reorganization. 12 In some cases lenders probably undertook
workouts where they believed that modest debt restructuring would
allow the farm to survive and the debts to be repaid. These workouts
were probably extension agreements, where the lender agrees to ac-
cept repayment over a longer period of time, reducing current pay-
ment requirements and improving the debtor's cash flow. These
workouts probably did not include significant debt write-off (composi-
tion agreements), in part because there were few effective legal op-
tions available to farmers facing foreclosure or bankruptcy. While
farmers can delay foreclosure through a mortgage foreclosure stay or
by filing bankruptcy, unless the farmer can find alternative financing
or negotiate a reorganization, his efforts will simply delay the inevita-
ble.' 3 Chapter 11 bankruptcy reorganization was not an effective al-
ternative to farmers prior to important 1986 Eight Circuit farm
bankruptcy decisions. Further, chapter 13 debt callings were too low
for most commercial farmers. If farm debt workout negotiations were
unsuccessful, or not even pursued, the lender's ultimate option was
foreclosure, which often led to the farmer's emergency bankruptcy
filing.
III. BANKRUPTCY AND NONBANKRUPTCY OPTIONS
PRIOR TO CHAPTER 12
If the farmer could not negotiate a workout with his creditors he
was subject to foreclosure. Foreclosure remedies provide a farmer/
debtor various rights. Mortgage foreclosure involves an optional nine
month stay if so requested by the debtor,4 and now involves redemp-
lation established crop liens in favor of those supplying seed, and/or electricity to
farmers. NEB.REv.STAT. §§ 52-1201 to 1204 (1986 Cum.Supp.). In addition priority
issues were clarified in 1985 regarding threshers's liens, veterinarians liens, petro-
leum products liens, and fertilizer liens. NEB.REV.STAT. §§ 52-504, 52-702, 52-905,
52-1104 (1986 Cum. Supp.).
12. J. ANDERSON & J. MORRIS, supra note 6, at § 1.03; R. AARON, BANKRuPTcY LAW
FUNDAMENTALS § 1.02 (1987). For a sample farm workout See Stowell, A Case
Study in Agricultural Workouts and Hearsay (Nebr. Continuing Legal Educ. May
31, 1985).
13. The exception to this scenario would be if crop prices (and land prices) rose sub-
stantially. Most farmers are optimistic and are willing to take this kind of gam-
ble. They remember the windfall profits cash grain farmers realized in the early
1970s as the result of poor worldwide harvests and the resulting high feedgrain
prices. See TRADING THE FUTURE, supra note 4.
14. NEB.REV.STAT. § 25-1506. (1985) Mortgage foreclosures are generally governed
by sections 25-2137 to 2155. If the debtor elects to pursue the one year automatic
stay, he forfeits his appeal rights. Carley v. Mortgan, 123 Neb. 498, 243 N.W. 631
(1932). Regarding mortgage foreclosures, see Berger, Solving the Problem ofAbu-
sive Mortgage Foreclosure Sales, 66 NEB.L.REv. 373 (1987); Comment, Avoidance
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tion rights as well as rights to cure default.15 Trust deed foreclosures
are not subject to a stay but now are subject to redemption rights as
well as an opportunity to cure default.16 Land contract forfeiture gen-
erally results in loss of the land.17 Regarding personal property, a per-
fected secured party may obtain possession of collateral pledged by a
defaulting farmer and sell it.18
One way for the farmer to avoid foreclosure prior to chapter 12 was
to file for reorganization bankruptcy under chapter 11 or chapter 13.19
The other bankruptcy option for farmers not wishing or able to reor-
ganize was chapter 7 liquidation. The farmer's bankruptcy options
prior to chapter 12 were not good. The adequate protection require-
ment and the absolute priority rule made farm chapter 11 plans virtu-
ally unconfirmable. In response Congress enacted chapter 12, the
objective of which is to confirm a farm reorganization plan rather than
to negotiate one.
of Foreclosure Sales As Fraudulent Transfers Under Section 548(a) of the Bank-
ruptcy Code: An Impetus to Changing State Foreclosure Procedures, 66
NEB.L.REv. 383 (1987).
The Farmer's Home Administration is subject to special administrative fore-
closure regulations. See Comment, Suing the Farmer's Home Administration-
Federal Farm Borrowers' Last Stand, 31 S.D.L.REv. 297 (1986); Comment, Agri-
cultural Law: FmHA Farm Foreclosures, An Analysis of Deferral Relief and the
Appeals System, 23 WASHB.L.J. 287 (1984).
15. Execution upon agricultural land is now subject to special homestead redemption
rights as well as rights to cure default. NEB.REV.STAT. §§ 76-1901-1916 (Supp.
1987).
16. Id. Regarding trust deeds see NEB.REv.STAT. § 76-1001 to 1018 (1986), Butler,
Trust Deeds Come of Age in Nebraska: A Survey and Analysis, 17 CREIGHTON
L.J. 283 (1984); Comment, In Deed an Alternative Security Device: The Nebraska
Trust Deeds Act, 64 NEB.L.REv. 92 (1985).
17. Comment, Installment Land Contracts: Remedies in Nebraska, 60 NEB.L.REv.
750 (1981).
18. NEB.REv.STAT. (U.C.C.) § 9-501 et seq. (1980). See Delay First Nat'l Bank &
Trust Co. v. Jacobson Appliance Co., 196 Neb. 398, 243 N.W.2d 745 (1976).
19. The topic of agricultural bankruptcies has received significant law journal atten-
tion. Recent articles include: Bland, Insolvencies in Farming and Agribusi-
nesses, 73 KY.L.REv. 795 (1985); R. Hershner & W. Boyer, The Farmer in
Distress-Can Bankruptcy Help? ANN.SURv.BANKR.L. 177 (1985); Looney, The
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 and the Farmer: A Survey of Applicable Provi-
sions, 25 S.D.L.REV. 509 (1980); Kunkel, Farmers' Relief Under the Bankruptcy
Code: Preserving the Farmers' Property, 29 S.D.L.REv. 303 (1984); Kunkel, The
Fox Takes Over the Chicken House: Creditor Interference With Farm Manage-
ment, 60 N.D.L.REV. 795 (1985); Reiley, Farming Failures and Drafting Failures:
The Uncertain Posture of Crop Financing Under Article 9 and Section 547 of the
Bankruptcy Code, ANN.SURV.BANKR.L. 29 (1983); Rosentrater, Protecting the
Lender's Rights When Farmers File for Bankruptcy, 29 S.D.L.REv. 333 (1984).
For a helpful introduction to the bankruptcy process, see R. AARON, BANKRUPTCY
LAW FUNDAMENTALS, ch. 1 (1987).
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A. Chapter 7 Liquidations.20
Chapter 7 is a liquidation proceeding. Nonexempt assets are liqui-
dated andor turned over to creditors by a bankruptcy trustee. Filing
the case initiates an automatic stay against debt collection efforts, and
generally stops interest accruing on outstanding loans. Exempt assets
are retained by the debtor and form the basis for the debtor's fresh
start. Prepetition liens are valid, however, unless avoided in bank-
ruptcy proceedings. Most debts not paid in chapter 7 are discharged if
the debtor is an individual, and taxable gains realized through postpe-
tition liquidation in chapter 7 are not taxed to the debtor even if the
taxes are not paid in the bankruptcy proceeding. This avoidance of
taxes arising from asset liquidation and debt forgiveness is one of the
significant advantages of chapter 7 liquidation over nonbankruptcy
farm liquidations. 2 ' The bankruptcy trustee may avoid certain prepe-
tition transactions, including preferential transfers and fraudulent
conveyances, to increase recovery by creditors. The debtor may avoid
certain prepetition liens, including liens on certain exempt property.
Chapter 7 bankruptcy allows a farm debtor to avoid deficiency judg-
ments and taxes resulting from property liquidation, and allows the
farm debtor an opportunity for a fresh financial start largely free of
prepetition debt.
Eligibility. Chapter 7 cases may be voluntary or involuntary.22
Farmers are protected from involuntary filings if they meet the bank-
ruptcy definition of a farmer.23 Farmers are defined by section
101(19) as a person who has received more than 80 percent of his gross
income during the prior taxable year from a farming operation owned
or operated by that person.24 If a farmer does not qualify as a
"farmer" under the Code, the farmer is subject to involuntary bank-
ruptcy.2 5 Small farmers will more likely not meet the farm income
20. A brief overview of the structure of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 101 -
1330, (West 1979) may be helpful. Chapter 1 deals with general provisions
relevant to all bankruptcy proceedings; chapter 3 deals with with case
administration (procedure), and chapter 5 deals with creditors, the debtor, and
the estate; i.e. the substance of bankruptcy case administration. Chapter 7 deals
with liquidation proceedings, chapter 11 deals with business reorganizations,
chapter 12 deals with family farmer reorganizations, and chapter 13 deals with
debt adjustment proceedings. Most provisions of chapter 1, 3, and 5 apply to
chapters 7, and 11-13 unless they are replaced by more specific provisions.
21. However, taxes arising from prepetition liquidations are not dischargeable but
can be paid in bankruptcy if the bankruptcy estate has sufficient assets and if the
debtor makes the short year election. See infra text accompanying notes 91-95.
22. 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 301, 303 (West 1979).
23. Id. §§ 303A, 1112(c).
24. Farming operation is defined to include "farming, tillage of the soil, dairy farm-
ing, ranching, production or raising of crops, poultry, or livestock, and produc-
tion of poultry or livestock products in an unmanufactured state." Id. § 101(20).
25. Id. §§ 303(h), 303(b). However, farmers who qualify as family farmers are now
1987)
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tests necessary to qualify as a farmer, and therefore will be subject to
involuntary bankruptcies.2 6
Automatic stay. The order of relief (i.e. the filing of a voluntary
bankruptcy petition 27) automatically stays all debt collection activities
against the debtor.28 The automatic stay is a feature of all bankruptcy
cases. The stay provides the debtor in any bankruptcy case the oppor-
tunity to deal with claims of creditors and others in a single proceed-
ing. The stay gives the debtor some breathing room and prevents one
creditor from enforcing its lien to the detriment of other creditors.29
In reorganization cases creditors may petition the court for relief
from the stay if the debtor is unable to provide adequate protection of
the creditor's interest, or if the debtor has no equity in the property
and if it is not necessary for an effective reorganization.30 Once the
order of relief is entered, interest on secured debts is stayed unless the
creditor is oversecured, in which case the debtor must pay interest at
the contract rate to the extent of the equity cushion.31 The order of
relief stops interest on unsecured debts unless the debtor is solvent, in
which case interest is paid at the legal rate to the extent of solvency.32
Bankruptcy estate. When the bankruptcy case is initiated, a sepa-
rate entity, the bankruptcy estate, is created.33 The bankruptcy estate
includes property seized by creditors prior to the filing of the peti-
tion,34 postpetition property acquired by the debtor within 180 days of
filing, including property received by gift or inheritance,3 5 and postpe-
tition proceeds, product, offspring, and rents or profits.36 The inclu-
also exempt from involuntary chapter 7 cases. 11 U.S.C.A. § 303(a). See infra text
accompanying notes 310-314.
26. The farm income tests are based on gross income, not net income, ergo most com-
mercial farmers should easily meet the bankruptcy farm income tests, even if a
significant portion of their net income is off farm income. Many farmers depend
significantly on off-farm income, particularly during periods of low crop prices,
even though off farm income is a relatively small portion of their gross farm
income. See K. FORSYTHE & B. JOHNSON, DEPT. OF AGRnc. ECONOMICS, UNIV. OF
NEBRASKA, OFF-FARM INCOME AND EMPLOYMENT IN NEBRASKA: IMPACTS AND
IMPLICATIONS (Staff Paper No. 6, July 13, 1987).
27. 11 U.S.C.A. § 301 (West 1979).
28. Id. § 362(a). Actions against the debtor not stayed are enumerated in § 362(b).
29. In re Ahlers, 794 F.2d 388, 393-94 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 55 U.S.L.W. 3852
(1987).
30. 11 U.S.C.A. § 362(d) (West 1979).
31. Id. § 506(b).
32. Id. § 362(a). Secured claims, administrative expenses, priority unsecured claims,
and unsecured claims are all paid in full before any interest on unsecured claims
is paid. Id. § 726(a)(1)-(5). When interest is paid it is paid at the legal rate, not
the contract rate. Id. § 726(a)(5).
33. Id. § 541(a).
34. United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198 (1983).
35. 11 U.S.C.A. § 541(5) (West 1979).
36. Id. at § 541(6). Postpetition alfalfa cuttings are property of the estate. In re Beck,
61 Bankr. 671 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1985).
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sion of postpetition property in the bankruptcy estate increases
payment on unsecured claims, including secured loan deficiencies and
unsecured creditors. Postpetition personal service income of the
debtor is not considered property of the estate.3 7 Filing the bank-
ruptcy petition usually cuts off an after acquired property clause in a
security agreement.38 However, if the prepetition security interest
covers proceeds, products, offspring, rents or profits, the security in-
terest attaches to such property.3 9
Classification of creditors's claims. The bankruptcy claim of a se-
cured creditor will not necessarily be a secured claim. The concept of
secured and unsecured differs significantly in bankruptcy from their
nonbankruptcy meaning. Creditors's claims are secured only to the
extent of the value of collateral.40 If a creditor is undersecured, i.e.
the current value of the collateral is less than the outstanding balance
due, the creditor has a secured claim to the extent of the value of the
collateral, and an unsecured claim to the extent of the deficiency. For
example, if the loan balance is $50,000 and the collateral is worth
$30,000, the loan deficiency is $20,000. The creditor would have a
$30,000 secured claim and a $20,000 unsecured claim for its $50,000
debt. Thus the undersecured creditor is both a holder of a secured
claim and a holder of an unsecured claim in bankruptcy. Given the
recent decline in agricultural land, most farm lenders are likely to be
undersecured. Trade creditors, such as seed, fuel, feed and chemical
dealers, are likely to be unsecured as they traditionally have not re-
quired collateral as a condition of extending credit.
Exempt property. Debtors are entitled to claim certain property as
exempt from creditors's claims in bankruptcy.41 The general effect of
the exemption is to preclude unencumbered property from liquida-
tion. Consensual liens on exempted property generally will survive
bankruptcy42 unless the liens are avoided.4 3
37. 11 U.S.C.A. § 541(6) (West 1979). Custom farming income is not considered prop-
erty of the estate. In re Lotta Water Land Co., 25 Bankr. 32 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.
1982). Exclusions from property of the estate are enumerated at 11 U.S.C.A.
§ 541(b). (West 1979). The corpus of a spendthrift trust is not property of the
estate. In re Leimer, 54 Bankr. 587 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1985).
38. 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(a) (West 1979).
39. Id. § 522(b); In re Hillyard, 48 Bankr. 10 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1984); In re Lawrence,
41 Bankr. 36 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1984); In re Jackels, 55 Bankr. 67 (Bankr. D. Minn.
1985); In re Beck, 61 Bankr. 671 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1985); In re Wobig, 73 Bankr. 292
(Bankr. D. Neb. 1987). See Kunkel, Walter & Lander, The Reach of Prefiling
Security Interests in Postfiling Proceeds of Agricultural Collateral-An Analy-
sis of Bankruptcy Code Section 552, 8 J.AGRIc. TAX'N & L. 311 (1987).
40. 11 U.S.C.A. § 506(a) (West 1979).
41. Id. § 522. See generally, Duncan, Through The Trap Door Darkly: Nebraska Ex-
emption Policy and the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 60 NEB.L.REv. 219
(1981).
42. 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(c)(2) (West 1979).
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The major personal property exemptions in Nebraska include: all
immediate personal possessions;44 kitchen utensils and household fur-
niture up to $1500;45 professional tools or equipment up to $1500;46 six
months food and fuel;47 an additional $2500 wildcard personal prop-
erty exemption for debtors not qualifying for the homestead exemp-
tion;48 up to $10,000 cash value in a life insurance policy 49 and/or
annuity,50 and most retirement plans.Sl The homestead real estate
property exemption is $10,000,52 although the exemption may be
waived for mortgages.53 Judicial liens and nonpossessory, nonpur-
chase money liens in certain exempt personal property, including pro-
fessional tools, may be voided in bankruptcy if the property is held
primarily for personal, family, or household purposes. 54
Trustee's avoiding powers. The bankruptcy trustee may avoid cer-
tain prepetition transactions, including preferential transfers 55 and
fraudulent conveyances.5 6 Any property recovered by the trustee in-
creases the recovery of unsecured claimants at the expense of the
party (typically secured) giving up the property recovered.
Preferential transfers. Preferential transfers are prepetition
43. Id. § 522(f).
44. NEB.REV.STAT. § 25-1556(1) (1985).
45. Id. § 25-1556(2).
46. Id. This exemption may be claimed by both spouses in a joint case. In re Keller,
50 Bankr. 23 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1985).
47. NEB.REv.STAT. § 25-1556(2) (1985).
48. Id. § 25-1552. This would include a head of household whose homestead exemp-
tion was ineffective against a mortgagee. NEB.REv.STAT. § 40-103 (1984). A wife
is entitled to claim this wildcard exemption even though her husband claimed a
homestead exemption. In re Hartmann, 19 Bankr. 844 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1982). See
also In re Welborne, 63 Bankr. 23 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1986).
49. NEB.REV.STAT. § 44-371 (Supp. 1987). Sickness and accident insurance proceeds
up to $200 per month are also exempt, as are disability lump-sum settlements. Id.
§§ 44-754- to 755 (1984), 25-1563.01 - 1563.02 (Supp. 1987). But see id. § 44-755.
Insurance benefits from fraternal societies were completely exempt prior to Au-
gust 29, 1987. Id. § 44-1089 (Cum.Supp. 1986), amended (Supp. 1987).
50. Id. § 44-371 (Supp. 1987). Prior to August 29, 1987, annuities in any amount were
exempt. Cf. id. (1984). Under current law up to $10,000 in life insurance cash
values, annuities, and fraternal society insurance proceeds are exempt. Id. §§ 44-
371, 44-1089 (Supp. 1987). The new exemptions apply to cases filed after August
29, 1987. 1987 Neb. Laws, LB 335 sec. 6.
51. NEB.REv.STAT. §§ 25-1563.01 (Supp. 1987).
52. NEB.REv.STAT. § 40-101 (Cum.Supp. 1986). For married spouses, only the hus-
band is entitled to claim the homestead exemptions as the head of household. In
re Hartmann, 19 Bankr. 844 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1982).
53. NEB.REv.STAT. § 40-103 (Reissue 1984). See id. §§ 40-101 to -117.
54. 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(f) (West 1979). Federal agencies are subject to exemptions on
the same basis as any other creditor. In re Kight, 49 Bankr. 437 (Bankr. W.D. Pa.
1985); In re Bubert, 61 Bankr. 362 (W.D. Tex. 1986), aff'd' 809 F.2d 259 (5th Cir.
1987); United States v. Victory Highway Village, Inc., 662 F.2d 488 (8th Cir. 1981).
55. 11 U.S.C.A. § 547 (West 1979).
56. Id. §§ 548, 544.
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transfers to favored (or, perhaps, insistent) creditors. For instance, a
farmer who in good faith sells crops and livestock pledged to his oper-
ating creditor, takes the sale proceeds, pays family living expenses and
local trade creditors, and is unable to pay the operating creditor in full,
may have made a preferential transfer. Another scenario is where the
debtor anticipates filing bankruptcy and pays favored creditors in full
before filing. Finally, a creditor may coerce a debtor into making pay-
ments in or outside of the regular course of business, or may setoff
mutual debts. Any of these prepetition transactions may constitute
preferential transfers that could be voided by the bankruptcy trustee.
The Bankruptcy Code defines preferential transfers as a transfer
of the debtor's property to or for the benefit of a creditor for or on
account of an antecedent debt of the debtor. The transfer must have
been made while the debtor was insolvent, 7 within 90 days of the
bankruptcy petition (one year for insiders,58 ) and enabling the credi-
tor to receive more than the liquidated value of the creditor's claim if
the transfer had not been made.59 Such transfers are not void, but are
voidable by the trustee.60 Transfers not considered preferential trans-
fers include transfers for new value and transfers made in the ordi-
nary course of business. 61 The trustee has the burden of proving that
the transfer is voidable, while the creditor has the burden of proving
that it qualifies for an exception.62 If the trustee succeeds in voiding
the preferential transfer, the property becomes property of the estate
and is available for distribution to creditors. The creditor who re-
ceived the transfer loses the benefit of his preference, and obtains only
the liquidated value of his claim, while the recovery of other creditors,
particularly those holding unsecured claims, is increased accordingly.
Fraudulent conveyances. Occasionally a desperate creditor may
seek to keep property, encumbered or unencumbered, from creditors.
Property may be transferred to relatives or other insiders as a gift or
for less than full market value. The transfer of encumbered property
denies the secured creditor its collateral. The transfer of unencum-
bered property denies the undersecured creditor property it could
reach through a deficiency judgment, as well as property that should
be available to satisfy the claims of unsecured creditors. A more re-
57. A debtor is presumed to be insolvent on and during the 90 days prior to filing a
bankruptcy petition. Id. § 547(f). Insolvency is defined as debts exceeding fairly
valued assets. Id. § 101(31).
58. Insiders are broadly defined to include relatives and business associates. Id.
§ 101(30).
59. Id. § 547(b). Regarding the determination of a claim's liquidated value, see infra
note 131 and text accompanying notes 475-81.
60. 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(6) (West 1979); See Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Davis, 10
C.B.C.2d 1413, 733 F.2d 1083 (4th Cir. 1984).
61. 11 U.S.C.A. § 547 (c) (West 1979).
62. Id. § 547(g).
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cent issue raised in this area of the law is whether foreclosure sales
for significantly less than full market value constitute fraudulent
conveyances. 63
The Bankruptcy Code has two provisions dealing with fraudulent
conveyances, one relying on state law and the second relying on bank-
ruptcy law. Section 544 allows the trustee to void transfers defined as
fraudulent under state law if a unsecured claim holder exists in the
case.6 4 Section 548 allows the trustee to void fraudulent transfers
made (whether voluntary or involuntary) and obligations incurred,
within one year before filing the bankruptcy petition, when the intent
of the transaction was to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor.65 The
section 544 fraudulent conveyances authority is significantly more
powerful than that available under section 548: conveyances for less
than fair consideration may be fraudulent without actual fraudulent
intent, and conveyances up to four years prior to bankruptcy may be
challenged.
The section 544 power to avoid fraudulent transfers depends upon
state law to define whether a transfer is fraudulent. Nebraska has
adopted the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyances Act.66 The major fea-
ture of the act is that conveyances made by debtors for less than ade-
quate consideration are fraudulent per se against creditors even
where the debtor lacked actual fraudulent intent.67 Such transac-
tions include conveyances which render the debtor insolvent,68 con-
veyances which leave a the debtor's business undercapitalized, 69 and
conveyances made when the debtor believes he is unable to pay debts
as they mature.70 Conveyances by debtors are also fraudulent when
undertaken with actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud creditors. 71
The statute of limitations is four years, significantly longer than the
one year fraudulent conveyance limitation of section 548(a)(1). 72
63. 11 U.S.C.A. § 101(50)(West 1979); In re Ruebeck, 55 Bankr. 163 (Bankr. D. Mass.
1985); In re Huhm, 11 C.B.C.2d 152, 738 F.2d 323 (8th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 990, 1984. See Berger, supra note 14; Comment, supra note 14.
64. 11 U.S.C.A. § 544(b) (West 1979) See In re Falcone, BK83-736 (D. Neb. 1985); In
re Kock, 20 Bankr. 453 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1982).
65. 11 U.S.C.A. § 548(a)(1)(West 1979).
66. NEB.REV.STAT. §§ 36-601 to -613 (1984).
67. Id. § 36-601.
68. Id. § 36-604, 36-602.
69. Id. § 36-605.
70. Id. § 36-606.
71. Id. § 36-607. Regarding fraudulent conveyances of partnership assets see id. § 36-
608.
72. Id. § 25-207 (1985). The statute probably begins to run upon discovery of facts
constituting the fraud or facts sufficient to put an ordinarily intelligent and pru-
dent person on inquiry which if pursued would lead to such discovery. Abels v.
Bennett, 158 Neb. 699, 64 N.W.2d 481 (1954); Hollenbeck v. Guardian Nat'l Life
Ins. Co., 144 Neb. 684, 14 N.W.2d 330 (1944). Creditors may have a fraudulent
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Property distribution. Property distribution in a chapter 7 bank-
ruptcy case is first to secured claim holders before unsecured claim
holders, although special rules apply to unsecured priority bankruptcy
claims. A creditor with an allowed claim secured by a lien against
property of the estate is entitled to repayment of the debt to the ex-
tent of the collateral before any other creditor is paid from the es-
tate.73 If the creditor is oversecured, i.e. if the collateral value
exceeds the secured claim, the secured creditor may recover postpeti-
tion interest up to the amount of the equity cushion.74 If the creditor
is undersecured, i.e. the amount of the debt exceeds the collateral fair
market value, the balance of the claim (i.e. the deficiency balance) is
treated as an unsecured claim.75
Once holders of secured claims have received their collateral or its
value, any remaining property is available for distribution to holders
of unsecured claims. However, certain unsecured claims are entitled
to priority treatment in that they will be satisfied first in full before
any distribution is made to general holders of unsecured claims.
There are seven priority claims categories, the most important of
which in farm liquidations typically are administrative expenses 76
and allowed unsecured tax claims.77 A priority category must be paid
in full before claimants in a lower priority category receive anything.78
If there are not sufficient assets to pay a priority class in full, the
members receive a pro rata share.79
After the payment of priority unsecured claims, any remaining
property is available for distribution to the remaining unsecured cred-
conveyance set aside unless the purchaser is an innocent purchaser for value.
NEB.REV.STAT. § 36-609 (1984).
73. 11 U.S.C.A. § 506(a) (West 1979). The value used is the collateral's fair market
value. In re Courtright, 57 Bankr. 495 (Bankr. D. Ore. 1986).
74. 11 U.S.C.A. § 506(a) (West 1979); In re Glenn, 796 F.2d 1144 (9th Cir. 1986). But
see In re Churchfield, 62 Bankr. 399 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1986). The recovery of
postpetition interest by oversecured creditors reduces the amount of property
available to satisfy unsecured claims.
75. 11 U.S.C.A. § 506(a) (West 1979).
76. Id. § 507(a)(1). Administrative expenses include unpaid filings fees, costs associ-
ated with preserving the estate, taxes incurred by the estate, and trustee compen-
sation. Id. § 503(b). Trustee's fees are limited in a chapter 7 case to a maximum
of up to 15% of the first $1000 in cash disbursed to creditors, 6% for cash disburse-
ments between $1000 and $3000, and 3% for cash disbursement amounts exceed-
ing $3000. Id. § 326(a). Property turned over to secured creditors is not included
in the trustee's fee calculations. H. R. REPT. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 327
(1977), reprinted in 5 U.S.CONG. & ADm. NEWS 5787 (1978). But cf. 11 U.S.C.A.
§ 506(c) (West 1979) 506(c). Trustee's fees must be reasonable. Id. § 330(a)(1).
Regarding debtors's attorney fees see id. § 329.
77. Id. § 507(a)(7).
78. Id. § 726(a)(1).
79. Id. § 726(b).
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itors.8 0 If any property remains after unsecured claims have been
paid, interest is paid at the legal rate from the date of filing on any
unsecured claim (including priority unsecured claims).81 Any re-
maining property is paid to the debtor.8 2
Debt discharge. Most debts not paid through the chapter 7 liquida-
tion process are discharged if the debtor is an individual.8 3 Major ex-
ceptions to discharge include: certain prepetition taxes,8 4 unscheduled
claims,85 and claims based on the receipt of money, property, or serv-
ices obtained by fraud, false pretenses or a materially false written
statement about the debtor's financial condition made to deceive cred-
itors and reasonably relied upon thereby.6 A discharge will be denied
where the debtor has committed fraud in connection with the case.8 7
A discharge cannot be obtained if the debtor received a discharge
under chapter 7 in a case begun within six years before filing the peti-
tion.8 8 Debts otherwise entitled to discharge may be affirmed if the
affirmation is in writing, was made after the order of relief, and has
been approved by the court.8 9 Creditors or the trustee may object to
debt discharge on the basis that the debtor is not entitled thereto.9 0
Income taxes. Taxable gains realized through liquidating assets in
chapter 7 are not taxed to the debtor even if the taxes are not paid in
the bankruptcy proceeding.91 Taxes arising from prepetition liquida-
tions may also be paid in bankruptcy (at the expense of unsecured
claim holders) if sufficient assets exist and if the debtor takes the
short year election. The debtor may elect to end his tax year the day
before he files bankruptcy.92 If he does so the tax claim becomes a
priority expense, which may then be paid as part of the bankruptcy
proceedings before unsecured claims are paid.93 Any unpaid taxes
80. Id. § 726(a).
81. Id. § 726(a)(5).
82. Id. § 726(a)(6).
83. Id. § 523.
84. Id. § 523(a)(1).
85. Id. § 727(a)(3).
86. Id. § 727(a)(2).
87. Id. § 727(a)(2)-(7).
88. Id. § 727(a)(8).
89. 11 U.S.C.A. § 729(a)(10)(West 1979).
90. 11 U.S.C.A. § 727(c).
91. I.R.C. § 6012(a)(9)(West 1986). See Flaccus, Taxes, Farmers, and Bankruptcy and
the 1986 Tax Changes: Much Has Changed But Much Has Remained the Same, 66
NEB.L.REv. 459 (1987); McCobb, Tax Planning for Farmers Under Financial Dis-
tress, 5 J.AGRIc. TAX'N & L. 76 (1983); Moratzka, A Farmer's Tax Liability in the
Event of Liquidation In or Out of Bankruptcy, 30 S.D.L.REV. 198 (1985); Shepard,
The Bankruptcy Tax Act and the Bankruptcy Code: A Study With Reference to
the Distressed Farm Economy, ANN.SuRv.BANKR.L. 159 (1986).
92. I.R.C. § 1398 (d)(2). See Flaccus, supra note 91, at 462-64.
93. 11 U.S.C. 507 (a)(7).
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arising from prepetition liquidations are not discharged.94 The possi-
bility of being able to avoid taxes arising from asset liquidation and
debt forgiveness is one of the significant advantages of chapter 7 liqui-
dation over nonbankruptcy liquidations.9 5
B. Chapter 11 Reorganizations. 9 6
Chapter 11 is a reorganization proceeding, the purpose of which is
to save the debtor's business by restructuring his finances. The re-
structuring may involve an extension agreement, where creditors are
paid in full but repayment terms are extended; a composition agree-
ment, where creditors accept reductions in the amount repaid; or some
combination of the two. In a voluntary chapter 11 case the petitioner
proposes a reorganization plan to creditors, a majority of which must
approve the plan. The usual focus of a chapter 11 proceeding is the
negotiation of the reorganization plan between the debtor and his
creditors. If the plan is disapproved by creditors, a cramdown plan
may be approved by the bankruptcy court over the objection of dis-
senting creditors if the creditors receive at least the liquidation value
of their claim, subject to the absolute priority rule. Chapter 11 pro-
ceedings are often marked by considerable litigation, typically regard-
ing relief from the automatic stay and use of cash collateral. 97
Eligibility. Chapter 11 cases may be voluntary or involuntary
although farmers are exempted from involuntary proceedings.9 8
However, involuntary plans (including liquidating plans) may be filed
by creditors in a voluntary case if the farmer has not proposed a reor-
94. Id. § 527 (a) (1) (A).
95. However, if assets are abandoned by the trustee pursuant to § 554(a) as having
inconsequential or no value to the estate, i.e. where the debtor has little or no
equity in the assets, the debtor may realize gain when the assets are repossessed
by creditors. See Mason v. Commissioner, 646 F.2d 1309 (9th Cir. 1980); In re
Sonner, 53 Bankr. 859 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1985); See also Flaccus, supra note 91, at
482-84.
96. See generally R. AARON, supra note 19, § 1.04; Anderson and Rainach, Farmer
Reorganizations Under the New Bankruptcy Code, 28 LOYOLA L.REv. 439 (1982);
Landers, Reorganizing a Farm Business Under Chapter 11, 5 J.AGRIC. TAX'N &
L. 11 (1983).
97. See R. AARON, supra note 19, § 1.04 at 1-13 to 1-14.
98. 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 301, 303 (West 1979). Normally farmers are exempt from involun-
tary bankruptcy proceedings. Id. § 303(a). If up to but not more than 80% of the
farmer's gross income was not from farming in the year prior to filing, however,
the farmer not a farmer for bankruptcy purposes, and therefore is subject to an
involuntary filing. Id. § 101(19). Many small farmers with significant off-farm
income cannot meet the 80% gross income test and therefore are subject to invol-
untary bankruptcies. See Dole, The Availability and Utility of Chapter 13 of the
Bankruptcy Code To Farmers Under the 1984 Bankruptcy Amendments, 16
TEXAs TECH L.REv. 433, 440 n.53 (1985). Now farmers qualifying as family farm-
ers are also exempt from involuntary chapter 11 proceedings. 11 U.S.C.A. 303(a).
See infra text accompanying notes 310-17.
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ganization plan within 120 days.99
Debtor in possession. The debtor's business is operated during
bankruptcy proceedings by the debtor acting as the debtor in posses-
sion. 100 The debtor in possession will be replaced by an independent
trustee only upon a showing of fraud, incompetence, or gross misman-
agement.10 The debtor in possession enjoys all the powers of a bank-
ruptcy trustee, including the lien avoidance powers.102 The debtor in
possession will operate the business unless the bankruptcy court inter-
venes at the request of a party in interest.1 03 Overseeing the debtor in
possession is the statutory creditors's committee which is typically
made up of trade creditors willing to serve.104 The committee is re-
sponsible for supervising the management efforts of the debtor in pos-
session as well as attempting to negotiate an acceptable reorganization
plan.05
Operating the business. The debtor is allowed to operate its busi-
ness in the normal course although certain actions require bankruptcy
court approval. The debtor may use, sell or lease property of the es-
tate in the normal course of business without court approval.0s If the
sale or property use falls outside the normal course of business, court
approval is required after notice and an opportunity for a hearing if
one is requested.O7 The debtor in possession may also affirm or dis-
affirm executory contracts and leases,108 as well as cure any de-
99. The debtor has the exclusive right to file a plan for 120 days within the order of
relief. 11 U.S.C. § 1121(b). (1982) The date of the order of relief is the date the
bankruptcy petition was filed in a voluntary chapter 11 case. Id. § 301. A creditor
may file a plan, including a liquidating plan, after 120 days. Id. § 1121(c)(2); In re
Button Hook Cattle Co. Inc., 747 F.2d 483 (8th Cir. 1984); In re Jasik, 727 F.2d
1379 (5th Cir. 1984). See Note, Bankruptcy Law and the Farmer: Are Farmers
Really Exempt From Forced Liquidation Under Chapter 11?, 25 WASHBURN L.J.
264 (1986).
100. 11 U.S.C. § 1101(1)(1982).
101. Id. § 1104(a)(1). Alternatively the bankruptcy court may appoint an examiner
rather than replace the debtor in possession. Id. § 1104(b). Either alternative is
rarely used. See Aaron, supra note 19, § 1.04 at 1-15.
102. 11 U.S.C. § 1107(1982).
103. Id. § 1108.
104. Id. § 341.
105. Id. § 1103.
106. Id. § 363(c).
107. Id. §§ 363(b), 102(a), Bankruptcy Rules 9007, 9013, and 9014 (Supp.III 1985).
108. 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(5)(G) (1982). In farm bankruptcies a controversial issue is
whether land contracts are contracts which may be disaffirmed, or whether the
land contract was really a lien created for financing the real estate sale. For a
case holding that a land contract is not an executory contract, see In re Booth, 19
Bankr. 53 (D. Utah 1982). See also Grossman, Installment Land Contracts for the
Sale of Farmland: Some Considerations in Bankruptcy, 8 J.AGRIc. TAX'N & L.
208 (1986); Grossman, Pre-Bankruptcy Forfeiture of Installment Land Contracts
for the Sale of Farmland, 8 J.AGRIC. TAX'N & L. 357 (1987). Regarding farm
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faults.0 9 Special procedures must be followed to use cash collateral.
Cash collateral is broadly defined to include any sale of pledged inven-
tory or equipment or collection of accounts.110 The debtor in posses-
sion may not use cash collateral without consent of the secured party
or a court hearing which considers whether the interest of the secured
party is adequately protected."'l Secured claimants are also entitled
to adequate protection of their collateral if it is used in operating the
business and the creditor requests relief from the automatic stay."12
Operating credit. Postpetition trade creditors who do business
with the debtor in possession may be paid immediately.1 3 Trade cred-
itors have first priority unsecured claim as an administrative ex-
pense.1 ' 4 If operating creditors are unwilling to extend credit on such
terms, they may be granted a "superpriority" lien on property of the
estate with bankruptcy court approval if existing lienors on the same
collateral are adequately protected (i.e. oversecured)."15
Reorganization plan. While the debtor in possession is operating
the business, the debtor is also negotiating a reorganization plan with
his creditors. The debtor in possession has an exclusive right to pro-
pose a reorganization plan within 120 days after the order of relief is
entered.116 Thereafter, unless an extension is granted, any party in
interest may propose a plan,1 7 including a liquidating plan.1 8 The
plan may involve an extension or composition, a partial liquidation, or
a bulk sale to another entity. The procedural steps to reach agree-
ment on a plan include negotiation among the debtor in possession,
the creditors's committee, secured claim holders, and equity holders
(if any).
The plan must group the creditors' claims by class according to
their legal interests.119 Typical groupings are made as follows: (1)
each secured claim holder is placed in an individual class, (2) un-
secured claim holders owed small amounts are grouped in a class, (3)
all priority unsecured claims are grouped in a class, and (4) all other
leases in bankruptcy see Grossman & Fischer, The Farm Lease in Bankruptcy: A
Comprehensive Analysis, 59 NOTRE DAME L.REV. 598 (1984).
109. 11 U.S.C. § 365 (1982). The rejected contract obligor or lessor has a claim for the
breach of contract. Id. §§ 365(g), 502.
110. Id. § 363(a).
111. Id. §§ 363(c)(2), 363(c)(3), 361. See also infra text accompanying notes 167-78.
112. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) (1982). See also infra text accompanying notes 149-66.
113. Id. § 364(a).
114. Id. §§ 364(a), 503(b)(1)(A), 507(1).
115. Id. § 364(c)-(d).
116. Id. § 1121(b). If an independent trustee has been appointed, the debtor loses the
exclusive right to propose a plan during the first 120 days of the case. Id.
§ 1121(c)(1); Bankruptcy Rule 3017 (Supp.III 1985).
117. 11 U.S.C. § 1121(c).
118. Id. § 1123(b)(4). See Comment, supra note 99.
119. Id. § 1122; Bankruptcy Rule 3013 (Supp.III 1985).
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unsecured claim holders are placed in a class.120 The plan must iden-
tify how each class will be treated.121 It will typically be proposed that
the class of small unsecured claims be paid in full.122 The priority
claims must be proposed to be paid in full, although payment may be
deferred.123 Proper grouping is important to obtaining successful ac-
ceptance of the plan. Classes vote according to a weighted major-
ity.1 2 4 For creditors, the weighted majority is one half of the class by
number and two thirds by debt amount. 25 Only those claims voting
are counted. All classes must accept the plan to avoid a cramdown;126
if one class dissents the plan has been defeated. A single secured
claim holder therefore may unilaterally defeat a plan if that particular
creditor's class (of which the creditor would typically be the only
member) votes against the plan.
Only impaired classes actually vote on a proposed reorganization
plan. A class which will be paid in full under the plan is not impaired
and therefore is deemed to have accepted the plan without a vote. 2 7
Typically the classes of small unsecured claims and priority claims are
unimpaired in a proposed reorganization plan. A class which is of-
fered nothing under the plan, e.g. unsecured creditors, is deemed to
have rejected the plan without a vote.128 Impaired claims, those (typi-
cally secured) which will not be paid in full under the plan but which
would receive some payment will vote on the plan.
Once the debtor in possession proposes a plan, the debtor may can-
vass the impaired classes.129 The bankruptcy court must approve the
debtor's disclosure statement prepared to adequately inform the im-
paired classes regarding the plan.130 The plan must indicate how all
classes will be treated, whether a class is impaired, and the liquidated
value of all claims.131 After the disclosure statement has been ap-
proved, the ballots are distributed to the impaired classes along with
120. See R. AARON, supra note 19, § 1.04 at 1-21 to 1-22.
121. 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(2), 1123(a)(3) (1982).
122. This is so that at least one class will be deemed to have accepted the plan in case a
cramdown is attempted. Id. § 1126(f). See also infra text accompanying notes
131-34.
123. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1123(a)(1), 1129(a)(9) (1982).
124. Bankruptcy Rule 3018 (Supp. III 1985).
125. 11 U.S.C. § 1126(c) (1982).
126. Id. § 1129(a)(8).
127. Id. § 1126(f). This also applies to claims where prepetition default is proposed to
be cured under the plan. Id. at § 1124(2).
128. Id. § 1126(g).
129. Id. § 1125.
130. Id. § 1125(b).
131. R. AARON, supra note 19, § 1.04 at 1-23. The liquidated value of a claim is what
the claimant would receive in chapter 7 bankruptcy. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7)(1982).
This is referred to as the best interests of creditors. Under the reorganization,
creditors are guaranteed that they will receive at least what they would have
received in bankruptcy liquidation proceedings.
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the disclosure statement 132 and, typically, a copy of the reorganization
plan itself.
Confirmation standards. After the impaired classes have voted
the bankruptcy court holds a confirmation hearing. 33 The plan can
be confirmed only if all confirmation requirements are met. 34 One
requirement is that all creditors receive as a minimum the liquidated
value of their claim.135 In addition, the plan must be feasible, i.e. un-
likely to result in liquidation or further reorganization. 36 Each im-
paired class must have voted to accept the plan by weighted
majority.137 If an impaired class has rejected the plan, it cannot be
confirmed unless additional confirmation requirements, the
cramdown requirements, are met.
The purpose of the cramdown option is to prevent a holdout credi-
tor from unreasonably blocking plan confirmation. To be approved by
the bankruptcy court over the objection of an impaired class, a
cramdown reorganization plan must not discriminate unfairly among
impaired classes, and it must be fair and equitable regarding impaired
classes.3 8 Fair and equitable treatment of impaired secured claims
means that under the plan (1) the secured claim holder will retain its
lien, and receive deferred cash payments totaling at least the value of
the collateral as of the plan's effective date, (2) the proceeds of any
sale of collateral is subject to the secured claim holder's lien, or (3) the
secured claim holder realizes the "indubitable equivalent" of its
claim.139 Fair and equitable treatment of impaired unsecured claims
(which includes the unsecured claims of undersecured creditors)
means that under the plan (1) unsecured claim holders will receive or
retain property valued on the effective date of the plan equal to the
allowed amount of the claim (i.e. the claim is paid in full), or (2) that
no junior claim or interest will receive or retain any property (the
absolute priority rule).4 0 Thus, for the debtor to retain any property
under the plan all dissenting impaired unsecured claims must be paid
in full, even if the liquidated value of such claims is zero.14'
Section 1111(b)(2) election.142 One additional option available to
132. Bankruptcy Rule 3017(d)(Supp.III 1985).
133. 11 U.S.C. § 1128 (1982).
134. Id. § 1129(a).
135. Id. § 1129(a)(7). See supra note 131.
136. Id. § 1129(a)(11). An exception is if the plan is a liquidating plan. Id.
137. Id. § 1129(a)(8).
138. Id. § 1129(b)(1). See Klee, All You Ever Wanted to Know About Cram Down
Under the New Bankruptcy Code, 53 Am.BANKaLL.J. 133 (1979).
139. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(1982).
140. Id. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii). See also infra text accompanying notes 179-91.
141. This applies to individual reorganizations. For corporate reorganizations, dissent-
ing impaired creditors would need to be paid in full before shareholders could
receive anything.
142. See Pusateri, Swartz & Shaiken, Section 1111(b) of the Bankruptcy Code: How
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undersecured creditors that can further complicate plan acceptance is
the section 1111(b)(2) election. Generally an undersecured creditor's
claim is divided into a secured claim to the extent of the collateral
value, and an unsecured claim for the deficiency. 143 Section 1111(b)(2)
authorizes a class of unsecured claimants that include undersecured
creditors to elect to have the claim treated as secured to the extent of
the entire claim, not simply to the extent of the collateral value, and
to waive the deficiency claim.144 This provides the undersecured cred-
itor with some interesting options. If the creditor has enough votes to
reject the plan it will not make the 1111(b)(2) election. However, if
the undersecured creditor does not have the votes to control the class,
it can make the 1111(b)(2) election. If the plan is approved, the under-
secured creditor gains the opportunity to share in any appreciation of
the collateral up to the full amount of the allowed claim, rather than
being limited to the asset's value on the effective date of the plan.
Effect of confirmation. A confirmed plan (whether creditor ap-
proved or cramdown) binds all parties, vests all property in the debtor
(subject to the plan's debt repayment requirements), and effects a dis-
charge on the unpaid portion of debts.145 A discharge cannot be ob-
tained if the debtor received a chapter 11 discharge in a case begun
within six years before filing the petition.146 If the plan is not con-
firmed, the bankruptcy court is likely to approve a creditor's liquidat-
ing plan if one has been filed, or to dismiss the case and leave creditors
to their state debt collection remedies.
Problems with chapter 11 farm reorganizations. Confirmation of a
chapter 11 reorganization plan has been difficult for farmers since un-
successful reorganizations have resulted in liquidation.147 The major
legal obstacles have been the adequate protection requirement, cash
collateral disputes, and the absolute priority rule. While the 1986
Ahlers148 decision has relaxed both the adequate protection and the
absolute priority rules in farm chapter 11 reorganizations in the Eight
Much Does the Debtor Have to Pay and When Should the Creditor Elect?, 58
AM.BANKR.L.J. 129 (1984).
143. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1982); See also supra text accompanying note 40.
144. 11 U.S.C. § 1111(b)(2) (1982). Undersecured creditors are ineligible for the
§ 1111(b) (2) election if their claims are worthless or of little value, or if the loan is
with recourse and the collateral will be sold under the plan or while the case is
being administered. Id. § 1111(b)(1)(a)(ii). In the latter case the creditor will
have an opportunity to bid on the collateral at sales and would still have an un-
secured claim for any deficiency.
145. Id. § 1141.
146. Id. § 727(a)(8).
147. If the farmer's reorganization plan was not confirmed and a liquidating plan had
been filed, the farmer would be subject to involuntary liquidation. See supra note
99 and accompanying text. Otherwise, the automatic stay would be lifted and
creditors would then be free to pursue debt collection remedies.
148. In re Ahlers, 794 F.2d 388 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 55 U.S.L.W. 3852 (1987).
[Vol. 66:632
FAMILY FARMER BANKRUPTCY
Circuit, the prior inability for farmers to successfully reorganize in
chapter 11 was a major factor leading to enactment of chapter 12.
Adequate protection. A major stumbling block to successful chap-
ter 11 farm reorganizations is the adequate protection requirement.
Secured creditors are entitled to receive adequate protection of the
value of their collateral in reorganization proceedings.14 9 The issue is
raised when a creditor requests relief from the automatic stay. Credi-
tors may petition the bankruptcy court for relief from the stay if the
debtor is unable to provide adequate protection of the creditor's inter-
est, or if the debtor has no equity in the property and it is not neces-
sary for an effective reorganization. 50 What constitutes adequate
protection is not defined by the Code, but does include cash payments,
periodic cash payments, an additional or replacement lien to compen-
sate the creditor for a decrease in the value of its collateral,151 or such
other relief that will allow the secured party to realize the indubitable
equivalent of its interest in the property. 52 In farm cases this would
include any collateral value declines resulting from normal asset de-
preciation plus any land value declines. If the debtor cannot provide
adequate protection, the secured creditor is entitled to obtain relief
from the automatic stay and to pursue state law debt collection reme-
dies.153 To provide adequate protection the debtor must give the se-
cured creditor cash payments or additional collateral to the extent
that the bankruptcy stay or use of the collateral reduces collateral
value.15 4 In addition the secured creditor is allowed to realize the "in-
dubitable equivalent" of its interest in the collateral.155 Some (but not
all) courts have ruled that the indubitable equivalent includes com-
pensating the creditor for the loss of the right to foreclose, the right of
reinvestment, and other lost opportunity costs. 15 6 These cases have
awarded creditors postpetition interest payments on the value of the
collateral in addition to cash payments for any decline in collateral
value.157 However, the Eighth Circuit has taken a more limited ap-
proach, ruling that adequate protection may include postpetition in-
149. 11 U.S.C. § 361(1982). See Molbert, Adequate Protection for the Undersecured
Creditor in a Chapter 11 Reorganization: Compensation for the Delay in Enforc-
ing Foreclosure Rights, 60 N.D.L.REv. 515 (1984).
150. Id. § 362(d).
151. Id. § 361(1)-(2).
152. Id. § 361(3).
153. Id. § 362(d)(1).
154. Id. §§ 361(1)-(2).
155. Id. § 361(3).
156. In re American Mariner Indus. Inc., 734 F.2d 426 (9th Cir. 1984); Grundy Nat'l
Bank v. Tandem Mining Crop., 754 F.2d 1436 (4th Cir. 1985). Contra In re Timbers
of Inwood Forest Assocs. Ltd., 793 F.2d 1380 (5th Cir. 1986).
157. Normally, postpetition interest on secured debts is stayed unless the creditor is
oversecured in which case the debtor must pay interest at the contract rate to the
extent of the equity cushion. 11 U.S.C. § 506(b)(1982).
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terest payments in compensation for the delay of enforcing the
creditor's foreclosure rights.158
If farmers filing bankruptcy could afford to pay postpetition inter-
est, they probably would not be in bankruptcy. Thus, adequate protec-
tion requirements have posed a significant threshold requirement for
farmers seeking chapter 11 protection. If relief from the automatic
stay is granted for failure to provide adequate protection the farmer's
reorganization efforts are in effect ended. The Eighth Circuit, in the
important 1986 Ahlers 159 decision, promulgated special adequate pro-
tection rules which gave farmers in chapter 11 relief from the ade-
quate protection requirements. The Court of Appeals affirmed its
earlier ruling that adequate protection may include postpetition inter-
est payments.1 60 But, the Court ruled that adequate protection pay-
ments should not begin until the creditor could have recovered the
collateral under state law, sold the collateral, and reinvested the pro-
ceeds.161 In real estate foreclosures this would include preforeclosure
notice periods, any stays, and any redemption period.162 It also stated
that adequate protection payments regarding personal property collat-
eral would not begin until the creditor applied for them.16 3 Collateral
would be valued for adequate protection purposes when payments be-
gan.1 6 4 Adequate protection payments would be made after farm
products were sold rather than monthly.16 5 The Court also ruled that
a lien on future crops could constitute an adequate protection pay-
ment.166 The Court did not discuss whether an adequate protection
payment of postpetition interest would be appropriate in a farm reor-
ganization case.
The Ahlers ruling which delays adequate protection payments on
farm real estate until the creditor could have obtained the land
through foreclosure gives the reorganizing farmer additional time to
have his plan confirmed. Prior to Ahlers the request for relief from
the stay and the demand of adequate protection requirement doomed
most farm reorganizations from the beginning. If postpetition inter-
est payments would not strain the reorganizing farmer's fragile cash
flow, the payments for postpetition collateral value declines would.
158. In re Briggs Transp. Co., 780 F.2d 1339, 1350 (8th Cir. 1985).
159. In re Ahlers, 794 F.2d 388 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 55 U.S.L.W. 3852 (1987).
160. Id. at 395, citing In re Briggs Transp. Co., 780 F.2d 1339, 1350 (8th Cir. 1985), cert.
granted, 55 U.S.L.W. 3852 (1987).
161. In re Ahlers, 794 F.2d 388, 396 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 55 U.S.L.W. 3852
(1987).
162. Id. at 395-96.
163. Id. at 396.
164. Id. at 396-97.
165. Id. at 397.
166. Id., citing In re Martin, 761 F.2d 472 (8th Cir. 1985), discussed infra at notes 172-
78.
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Ahlers does not dismiss the adequate protection requirement, how-
ever, and postpetition interest plus payments reflecting a loss of value
which occurrs after the creditor would have obtained the land through
foreclosure may be imposed on reorganizing farmer under the ade-
quate protection rule. However, Ahlers does give reorganizing farm-
ers in chapter 11 an additional period free of real estate adequate
protection payments. This additional period may give the farmer suffi-
cient time to propose a reorganization plan, which may ultimately en-
hance the farmer's chances for a successful chapter 11 reorganization.
Cash collateral. Prior to Ahlers few chapter 11 farm reorganiza-
tions survived past the relief from the automatic stay-adequate protec-
tion hearing. If they did, however, they typically would face
additional difficulties in obtaining permission to use cash collateral to
operate the farm pending reorganization. Cash collateral, which is de-
fined broadly to include nearly any current asset,167 cannot be used
without the consent of the lienor unless the bankruptcy court autho-
rizes its use.168 If the lienor does not consent, the court may authorize
the cash collateral use if the lienor's interest is adequately pro-
tected.169 Adequate protection may be provided by cash payments, pe-
riodic cash payments, an additional or replacement lien to compensate
the lien holder for any reductions in collateral value, or such other
relief that will allow the secured party to realize the indubitable
equivalent of its interest in the collateral.170 In farm reorganizations
the debtor typically requests permission to use the proceeds obtained
from selling encumbered crops or livestock for operating expenses
rather than turning the proceeds over to creditors. To meet the ade-
quate protection requirement farm debtors will propose to give credi-
tors a lien on next year's crop as a substitute lien. The future crop
generally will be available for a replacement lien because any after
acquired property interest in crops planted postpetition will be cut off
by the automatic stay.171
The considerations in providing adequate protection for use of cash
collateral are somewhat different from those regarding relief from the
automatic stay. Regarding the latter, the creditor is requesting com-
pensation for the delay in its foreclosure rights. Regarding cash collat-
eral, the creditor is seeking to insure that the value of its collateral is
maintained, even though the corpus of the collateral may change. In
167. 11 U.S.C. § 363(a)(1982).
168. Id. § 363(c)(2).
169. Id. § 363(e).
170. Id. § 361.
171. Id. § 552(a). See In re Beck, 61 Bankr. 671, 673 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1985), citing In re
Sheehan, 38 Bankr. 859 (D.S.D. 1984). Livestock and perennial crops, such as
alfalfa, are however likely to be subject to any prepetition security interests. 11
U.S.C. § 552(b)(1982). See also In re Wobig, 73 Bankr. 292 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1987),
discussed infra notes 433-36.
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both cases the creditor is seeking to protect its interest, but its interest
is not the same in both cases. Adequate protection as it relates to use
of farm cash collateral was considered by the Eight Circuit in In re
Martin.17 2 In Martin the debtor farmer proposed to sell stored grain
subject to a Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) lien, use the pro-
ceeds to plant a new crop, and provide CCC with a substitute lien on
the future crop. 173 The farmer also proposed to assign federal crop
insurance proceeds to the CCC.174 The Eighth Circuit ruled that in
considering requests to use cash collateral, the bankruptcy court must
establish the value of the secured creditor's interest, identify the risks
to secured party's value resulting from the proposed cash collateral
use, and determine whether the debtor's offer of adequate protection
protects collateral value as nearly as possible against risks to value
consistent with the concept of indubitable equivalence.175 Regarding
use of a substitute lien on future crops, the Court indicated that the
bankruptcy court's factual determinations should include (1) the an-
ticipated crop yield in light of the land's productivity, (2) the farmer's
husbandry practices, including proven crop yields from prior years, (3)
the health and reliability of the farmer, (4) the condition of the
farmer's machinery, (5) whether encumbrances on the machinery
may subject it to repossession before the crop is harvested, (6) any
competing liens on the future crop, (7) crop insurance availability and
the likelihood of an uninsured loss, and (8) anticipated market prices
for the crop.176 The Court indicated that the bankruptcy court should
enjoy broad discretion in requiring modification of the proposed ade-
quate protection to protect creditors's interests, and should reject the
offer of adequate protection if creditors's interests are not adequately
protected thereby.177
Cash collateral disputes are unlikely to hinder a farm reorganiza-
tion if the farmer is able to offer adequate protection to creditors with
replacement liens on cash collateral. Where the farmer is unable to
172. In re Martin, 761 F.2d 472 (8th Cir. 1985).
173. Regarding the CCC, see Comment, The Commodity Credit Corporation's Price
Support Loan Program: Should It Continue?, 31 S.D.L.REv. 350 (1986).
174. Regarding federal crop insurance, see 7 U.S.C. § 1508(a) (1982); 1 DAVIDSON, Ac-
RICULTURAL LAW § 1.31 (1981 & Cum.Supp. 1986).
175. In re Martin, 761 F.2d 472, 476-77 (8th Cir. 1985).
176. Id. at 477. The market price criterion would also involve a consideration of possi-
ble or likely changes in farm programs. See generally Comment, supra note 173;
Comment, Federal Direct Price Support Payment Programs, 31 S.D.L.REV. 363
(1986). Normally cash grain farmers can predict next year's price with a high
degree of certainty if they participate in the federal farm program. Only the fu-
ture yield would be unknown. See In re Ahlers, 794 F.2d 388, 408-10 (8th Cir.
1986), cert granted, 55 U.S.L.W. 3852 (1987).
177. In re Martin, 761 F.2d. 472, 477-78 (8th Cir. 1985). The Court also suggested that
CCC would be entitled to interest payments if the farmer's repayment of its CCC
loan were delayed through the use of cash collateral. Id. at 477.
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provide cash collateral, of course, the reorganization attempt is
doomed. In some cases the expense and perhaps more significantly
the delays occasioned by cash collateral litigation may be sufficient to
frustrate the farm debtor's reorganization attempt.1 7 8
Absolute priority rule. If the farm debtor can survive the adequate
protection challenges and cash collateral disputes, he then can propose
a reorganization plan. If an undersecured creditor objects to the plan,
however, the absolute priority rule will in virtually every case prevent
plan confirmation, even as a cramdown. Under the absolute priority
rule if any impaired class rejects the plan, the class must be paid in
full before any junior class (including equity holders, e.g. the reorga-
nizing farmer) can receive anything, even in a cramdown. 79 Thus,
since in most farm reorganization cases there are no or insufficient
unencumbered assets available to satisfy unsecured claims for defi-
ciencies, the farmer could not retain an equity interest in the farm
unless all dissenting classes were paid in full. The absolute priority
rule amounts to an absolute bar to confirmation, in farm reorganiza-
tions and in virtually all noncorporate reorganizations, if the plan is
not accepted by creditors.'8 0 As a result, courts have fashioned excep-
tions to the absolute priority rule which allow shareholders to retain
an equity interests in the reorganized business, even if dissenting un-
secured claims were not paid in full, to the extent that the sharehold-
ers contributed new value essential to a successful reorganization as
part of the reorganization plan.18 1 In Ahlers, the Eight Circuit ex-
tended this fresh contribution exception to farm reorganizations
where the farmer contributes his labor and management to the reor-
ganization effort.182
In Ahlers undersecured creditors argued that the debtor could not
propose a confirmable plan because the creditors intended to vote
against any plan that would not pay unsecured claims in full, prevent-
ing cramdown confirmation under the absolute priority rule.183 How-
178. An issue in Martin was whether the appeal was mooted by the passage of time,
i.e. planting had already occurred when the appeal was held. The Court of Ap-
peals held that the issue was not moot, but instructed the bankruptcy court to
reconsider the cash collateral issue only if the debtor still needed to use the cash
collateral, i.e. had not made other financial arrangements. Id. at 474, 478-79.
179. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii)(1982).
180. This feature of the absolute priority rule has been criticized as being appropriate
only to corporate reorganizations where shareholders and managers are distinct
groups. Comment, In re Ahlers: The Farm Reorganization Exception to the Abso-
lute Priority Rule, 32 S.D.L.REv. 167, 172-74(1987).
181. Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., 308 U.S. 106 (1939); In re Landau Boat
Co., 13 Bankr. 788 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1981); In re Marston Enterprises, Inc., 13
Bankr. 514 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981). See Comment, supra note 180 at 174-75.
182. In re Ahlers, 794 F.2d 388, 402-403 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 55 U.S.L.W. 3852
(1987).
183. Id. at 399-401.
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ever, the Court, after reviewing the fresh contribution exception
cases, concluded that the absolute priority rule was subject to a fresh
contribution exception where the debtor "contributes to the reorgani-
zation enterprise something that is reasonably compensatory and is
measurable."s4 The Court then asserted that "a farmer's efforts in
operating and managing his farm is essential to any successful farm
reorganization, and that such yearly contribution is measurable in
money or money's worth."'18 5 The Court suggested that in determin-
ing the value of the farmer's contributions, it would not be difficult to
value the farmer's labor, experience and expertise. But, it concluded
that valuing the retained ownership interest would be more diffi-
cult.186 The Court suggested, however, that no ownership equity
would mature until the plan had been completed and all secured
claims paid.18 7 To protect unsecured claimants the Court suggested
that any income in excess of that anticipated by the reorganization
plan should be paid to unsecured claimants on a prorata basis up to
full payment without interest.18 8
One factor noted by the Eighth Circuit but not formally incorpo-
rated into its ruling was that Ahlers proposed to pay the unsecured
claims in full without interest, as opposed to no recovery if the farm
were liquidated.18 9 The Court noted that Ahlers had excellent pros-
pects for rehabilitation in that if his debt was restructured to reflect
current asset values he could pay all secured claims and "make sub-
stantial payments to unsecured creditors."190 Nowhere in its opinion
does the Court suggest that its ruling is contingent upon the creditor
making substantial payments to unsecured creditors. Yet one won-
184. Id. at 402.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 403. One commentator has suggested that the cost of farm management
services could be used to value the farmer's labor and management contribution,
and that a capitalized earnings test could be used to calculate ownership equity.
Comment, supra note 180, at 177-78.
187. In re Ahliers, 794 F.2d 388, 403 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 55 U.S.L.W. 3852
(1987).
188. Id. at 403. The Court also suggested that if any encumbered property were sold
during the period of the plan, any surplus should be distributed to unsecured
claim holders. Id.
189. Id. at 413. This outcome was dependent on Ahlers being able to achieve their
projected farm income, which includes future crop yields and crop prices, both of
which are uncertain. In addition, because the farm price supports are scheduled
to decrease from from 1985 to 1990, and because further price support reductions
may result from Gramm-Rudman-Hollings or other deficit reduction measures,
both suggest that Ahlers projected farm income should be reduced to accommo-
date these expectations. See Comment, Food Security Act of 1985: Price Support
Programs, 31 S.D.L.REv. 490 (1986); Comment, Gramm-Rudman-Hollings and
the Farm Bill Solution or Suicide Pact?, 31 S.D.L.REv. 541 (1986).
190. In re Ahlers, 794 F.2d 338, 399 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 55 U.S.L.W. 3852
(1987).
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ders if the outcome would have been the same if unsecured creditors
would have received little or no payment. Implicit in the Court's anal-
ysis is the assumption that the unsecured creditors were substantially
better off with the plan than they would be in liquidation.19' If this
suggestion is correct, the Ahlers fresh contribution exception is implic-
itly subject to the limitation that unsecured claimants must receive
significantly more than the liquidated value of their claim (which
often is nothing). In a case where unsecured claimants would receive
little more than the liquidated value of their claim under the proposed
reorganization plan there would seem to be little economic benefit
(generally or to creditors) from approving the reorganization, and
therefore, no reason for invoking the fresh contribution exception to
the absolute priority rule.
Prior to Ahlers the absolute priority rule constituted a near abso-
lute barrier to farm chapter 11 reorganizations. To the extent that
Ahlers creates a fresh contribution exception to the absolute priority
rule for farm reorganizations, it provides farm debtors with the possi-
bility of a successful chapter 11 farm reorganization. The debtor may
be required to demonstrate, however, that unsecured claimants will
significantly benefit from the reorganization relative to liquidation.
In the absence of such a showing, the justification for allowing a fresh
contribution exception might fail.
C. Chapter 13 Debt Adjustments.' 92
Chapter 13 differs markedly from chapter 11. Based on wage
earner bankruptcies under former bankruptcy law, the goal of chapter
13 is confirmation of a debt adjustment plan rather than negotiation
and creditor acceptance of the plan.19 3 Chapter 13 is intended by Con-
gress to provide an inexpensive alternative for consumers to chapter 7
liquidation which gives at least partial payment to unsecured creditors
who would otherwise generally receive nothing in chapter 7. While
creditors may seek relief from the automatic stay, the short time pe-
riod of chapter 13 proceedings effectively makes seeking each relief a
moot effort.194 There is no absolute priority rule, and the debt adjust-
ment plan may be "crammed down" objecting secured claim holders.
If unsecured claim holders object to the plan then they are entitled to
share any of the debtor's disposable income during the life of the plan.
A chapter 13 debtor is eligible for a broader "super discharge" similar
to a chapter 7 or 11 discharge. Congress drew heavily on chapter 13 in
drafting chapter 12.
191. Id. at 402-03.
192. See generally R. AARON, supra note 19, § 13; Dole, supra note 98.
193. See R. AARON, supra note 19, § 13.01[1] at 13-14.
194. 11 U.S.C. 1301 (1982). Debt collection against codebtors on consumer debts is also
stayed. Id.
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Eligibility. Chapter 13 is voluntary only.195 Eligibility is limited to
individuals, sole proprietorships, and married couples filing jointly
with no more than $350,000 of secured debt and $100,000 of unsecured
debt, which would exclude most commercial farmers. 196 Business
debtors are eligible for chapter 13 if they are neither incorporated nor
a partnership. 197 Farm couples who own and operate property jointly
are not automatically considered partners, and may be eligible for
chapter 13.198 The filing fee is $90.199 The debtor must have suffi-
ciently stable and regular income to make the proposed payments.200
Farmers have been held to have an income sufficiently stable and reg-
ular to qualify for chapter 13.201 A case may be converted from chap-
ter 7 or 11 to chapter 13 only by the debtor.20 2 The debtor may convert
a chapter 13 case to chapter 7 or 11, or dismiss the case.203 A chapter
13 case may be converted to chapter 7 or 11 at creditors's request but
not against a farmer.204
Case administration. The debtor remains in possession of his prop-
erty during the proceeding: there is no separate bankruptcy estate.20 5
The chapter 13 plan must be filed within 15 days of the petition,2 06
which may be one reason many farm bankruptcy attorneys have opted
for chapter 11 rather than chapter 13. The plan or summary is sent to
creditors as part of the notice for the confirmation hearing, which
must be held within 25 days of the notice.20 7 This will be approxi-
mately at the same time as the first meeting of creditors, which must
be held within 20-40 days after filing the bankruptcy petition.20 8 Plan
payments must begin within 30 days of the petition unless the bank-
ruptcy court orders otherwise, even if the plan has not been con-
195. Id. § 303(a). Attempts have failed to authorize involuntary chapter 13 cases to
avoid abuse of chapter 7 liquidations. See R. AARON, supra note 19, § 13.01[1], at
13-3.
196. 11 U.S.C. § 109(e) (1982).
197. Id. § 101(29).
198. See In re Hansen, 60 Bankr. 359 (Bankr.D. Neb. 1982), appeal dismissed, 702 F.2d
728 (8th Cir. 1983) cert. denied 463 U.S. 1208 (1983); Ogallala Fertilizer Co. v. Sal-
sbery, 186 Neb. 537, 184 N.W.2d 729 (1971); Dole, supra note 98, at 446-47.
199. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1930 (West Supp. 1987). A financially distressed debtor may pay the
fee in up to four installments over up to 180 days. Fed. Bankr. R. 1006(b). The
debtor's attorney may not be paid until the filing fee has been paid. Id.
1006(b)(3).
200. 11 U.S.C. § 101(18).
201. See Dole, supra note 98, at 447-48.
202. 11 U.S.C. §§ 706, 1112(d) (1982).
203. Id. § 1307(a),(b),(d).
204. Id. § 1307(c),(d),(e), 303(a). For the bankruptcy definition of a "farmer", see supra
text at note 24.
205. Id. § 1306(b).
206. Id. 3015.
207. Id. 2002(b).
208. Fed. Bankr. R. 2003(a).
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firmed.209 Creditors are subject to the automatic stay, although there
is an additional stay for codebtors on consumer debt.210 Creditors
may apply for relief from the automatic stay, and cash collateral rules
apply in chapter 13 proceedings in the same fashion as in chapter 11.
The major difference is that chapter 13 proceedings are so short rela-
tive to chapter 11 proceedings that adequate protection issues will not
loom as large as they do in chapter 11 proceedings.211 There is some
dispute regarding whether chapter 13 debtors may claim property ex-
emptions (as they retain all property) or may exercise lien avoidance
powers. 2 1 2
Chapter 13 plan. The plan must be filed with the petition or 15 days
thereafter.213 The debtor typically will classify creditors as secured
(with each creditor normally being a separate class), priority, and un-
secured.2 1 4 Some cases have approved a special category for un-
secured creditors essential to the debtor's future operation and have
proposed that the plan pay such creditors more than other unsecured
creditors.21 5 The plan may modify the rights of secured or unsecured
claim holders,216 and provide for the curing or waiving of any de-
fault.21 7 Plans may be three to five years long,218 and secured claims
may be paid over a longer period.219 Unsecured claim holders do not
vote on the plan, although they may object to confirmation. 220 Se-
cured claim holders may reject the treatment of their claim in the
plan.22 1
Confirmation standards. Any creditor may object to confirma-
tion.222 To be confirmed the chapter 13 plan must provide that
enough of the debtor's income will be given to the trustee to make
payments under the plan,2 23 that all priority claims will be paid in full
209. 11 U.S.C. § 1326(a) (Supp.III 1985).
210. Id. § 1301.
211. See R. AARON, supra note 19, § 13.02[3] at 13-18.
212. Id. § 13.02[4]-[5].
213. Fed. Bankr. R. 3015.
214. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(3)(1982).
215. See Dudley v. Mealey, 147 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1945); In re Realty Assocs. Sec. Corp.,
53 F.Supp. 1010 (E.D.N.Y. 1943); Amfac Dist. Corp. v. Wolff., 22 Bankr. 510 (9th
Cir. 1982).
216. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (1982). However a residential mortgage cannot be modi-
fied. Id.
217. Id. § 1322(b)(3),(5).
218. Id. § 1322(c).
219. Id. §§ 1322(b)(2),(3),(5), 1328(a)(1).
220. Id. § 1325(b)(1) (Supp.III 1985).
221. Id. § 1325(a)(5)(A) (1982).
222. Id. § 1324.
223. Id. § 1325(a)(1), 1322(a)(1). The court may order any entity from which the
debtor receives income to pay any or all of the income directly to the chapter 13
trustee. Id. § 1325(c) (Supp.III 1985).
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unless the claim holder accepts different treatment,224 that the same
treatment will be provided for all claims within a particular class,225
that at least the liquidated value of all unsecured claims will be
paid,226 that the plan is proposed in good faith,227 and that the plan is
feasible.228 A secured claim holder may accept the plan, thereby con-
senting to whatever treatment of its claim was proposed therein.229 If
a secured claim holder rejects the plan it must either retain its lien
under the plan and receive the liquidated value of its claim,2 30 or re-
ceive the collateral. 231 If the trustee or an unsecured claim holder ob-
jects to confirmation, the objecting unsecured claim holder must
either be repaid in full or else the debtor must commit all disposal
income to plan payments.23 2
Implementing the plan. The debtor must provide enough of his
income to the trustee who will then make payments to creditors. 233 In
chapter 13 cases the fees for a standing or U.S. trustee is up to 5% of
all payments made under the plan.234
Chapter 13 debt discharge. The scope of the chapter 13 debt dis-
charge is much broader than chapter 7 debt discharge. The only debts
that are not discharged are debts for alimony, child support, and long
term debt.235 Priority claims (including priority tax claims) can be
discharged, as can secured claims paid within the period of the plan.
In addition, a chapter 13 debtor's super discharge could include dis-
charge from a debt resulting from a forged check,23 6 conversion of col-
lateral, 237 or the obtaining of loans under false pretenses.238 The
justification for this super discharge is to encourage debtors to elect
chapter 13 bankruptcy rather than chapter 7 liquidation.2 39 Dis-
charge occurs when the debtor has made all payments under the
224. Id. §§ 1325(a)(1), 1322(a)(2)(1982).
225. Id. §§ 1325(a)(1), 1322(a)(3).
226. Id. § 1325(a)(4).
227. Id. § 1325(a)(3).
228. Id. § 1325(a)(6).
229. Id. § 1325(a)(5)(A).
230. Id. § 1325(a)(5)(B).
231. Id. § 1325(a)(5)(C).
232. Id. § 1325(b)(1)(Supp. III 1985). Disposal income is income not required or main-
tenance or support of the debtor and his family. Id. § 1325(b)(2)(A). For a busi-
ness debtor disposal income also includes income not required for the
continuation, preservation and operation of the debtor's business. Id.
§ 1325(b)(2)(B).
233. Id. § 1326(c).
234. Id. § 1326(b).
235. Id. § 1328(a) (1982).
236. Cleveland Trust Co. v. Keckler, 3 Bankr. 155 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1980).
237. Overland Park Dodge, Inc. v. Graff, 7 Bankr. 426 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1980).
238. In re Marlow, 1 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 705 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1980).
239. See R. AARON, supra note 19, § 13.01[1], at 13-2.
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plan.240 The chapter 13 debtor may also be able to qualify for a "hard-
ship discharge." The bankruptcy judge may discharge the debtor from
any remaining liability under the plan if (1) the debtor has made a
good faith effort to implement the plan but cannot do so for circum-
stances beyond the debtor's control, (2) the plan could not be imple-
mented even if modified, and (3) unsecured claim holders had received
the liquidated value of their claims.24' The debtor would still be lia-
ble only for debts consisting of alimony, child support, and long term
debt.242 An earlier chapter 13 discharge does not bar a subsequent
chapter 7 discharge within six years if the debtor paid 100% of the
unsecured claims, or the debtor paid 70% of the unsecured claims, the
plan was proposed in good faith and was the debtor's best effort.243
Chapter 13 has many advantages for farm debtors if they can meet
the debt and entity limitations. The absence of the absolute priority
rule is a significant advantage, as is the super discharge. The possible
ability to separately classify unsecured creditors essential to future op-
erations and give them favored repayment terms is another significant
advantage. The debt and entity limitations of chapter 13, however,
preclude most commercial farmers from utilizing these advantages.
To those farmers who can qualify under the chapter 13 debt ceiling
and entity requirements, chapter 13 is an attractive reorganization
alternative.244
IV. CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE
Until the Ahlers decision was handed down in 1986 farmers had no
realistic chance of reorganizing in chapter 11 bankruptcy. Adequate
protection requirements, particularly postpetition interest, led to cred-
itors obtaining relief from the automatic stay, resulting in loss of the
farmer's land and dooming any reorganization attempt. If a farmer
could survive the relief from the automatic stay, the absolute priority
rule virtually insured that farmers could not propose a confirmable
reorganization plan, leaving farmers vulnerable to creditor's liquidat-
ing plans. Chapter 13 provided an attractive farm reorganization al-
ternative, but was not available to corporations, partnerships, or
farmers with debts exceeding the relatively modest debt limitations.
In addition the chapter 13 plan had to be submitted within 15 days, a
requirement many otherwise qualified farmers found difficult to
240. 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a)(1982).
241. Id. § 1328(b).
242. Id. § 1328(c).
243. Id. § 727(a)(9).
244. A South Dakota State University study indicated that 22% of the farmers filing
for chapter 11 could have qualified for chapter 13. JANSSEN & SCHMIESING, DEP'T
OF ECONOMICS, UNIV. OF SOUTH DAKOTA, REPT. No. 87-6 EXAMINATION OF FARM
BANKRUPTCY DEBTORS AND THEIR CREDITORS (1987).
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meet. Thus, most farmers had no effective bankruptcy reorganization
alternative.
In response to these problems, farm bankruptcy bills were intro-
duced in Congress in 1985 which resulted in the Bankruptcy Judges,
United States Trustees, and Family Farmers Bankruptcy Act of 1986.
Family farmer bankruptcy legislation was first enacted in the House
in 1985. The House bill allowed those qualifying as family farmers to
reorganize in chapter 13 if their total debt did not exceed $1 million.
The Senate instead established a new family farmer bankruptcy chap-
ter as chapter 12 in its bill. The Senate version ultimately was adopted
by the Conference Committee and was signed by President Reagan on
October 27, 1986.245
H.R. 1397 and 1399 were introduced in the House of Representa-
tives on March 5, 1985. Both bills modified chapter 13 proceedings
and to a lesser extent modified chapter 11 proceedings for those who
qualified as family farmers. H.R. 1397, introduced by Representative
Rodino, would have defined family farmer as a person receiving at
least 75% of his gross income for the preceding year from farming.246
Incorporated family farms would have qualified for family farmer
bankruptcy treatment if 90% of the stock was owned by the farm fam-
ily and the stock was not publicly traded.247 Those qualifying as fam-
ily farmers could file for chapter 13 bankruptcy if they had regular
annual income and their total debt did not exceed $1 million.248 Fam-
ily farmer debtors would have been given up to seven years to com-
plete a chapter 13 reorganization plan,249 which would offer greater
repayment of unsecured claims. In a family farmer chapter 13 case
the bankruptcy judge would have been authorized to allow repay-
ments to begin within a reasonable time after the plan were filled
rather than the standard 30 days.250 This would reflect the fact that
most farmers receive their income on a yearly basis.251 H.R. 1397 also
would have modified chapter 11 reorganizations for family farmers.
The exclusive period for the debtor's filing a chapter 11 reorganization
plan would have been extended for farmers from 180 days to 240 days,
while the exclusive period for the debtor to obtain plan approval
245. Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees, and Family Farmers Bankruptcy Act
of 1986, Pub.L., 99-554 § 225, 100 Stat. 3088, 3105 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C.
§§ 1201-1231). For a brief legislative history of chapter 12 see J. ANDERSON & J.
MORRIS, supra note 6, at § 1.23.
246. H.R. 1397 sec. 1(b), 99th Cong., 1st. Sess. (1985).
247. Id. § 1(b).
248. Id. § 2.
249. Id. § 4.
250. Id. § 5.
251. This would be true for most cash grain farmers with a single cropping season, as
would generally be the case in the plains and midwest. Dairy farmers market
their products weekly, however, and many livestock producers market their pro-
duction several times a year.
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would have been extended for farmers from 180 days to 300 days.2 52
Finally, H.R. 1397 would have reduced the farm income requirement
from 80% to 75% regarding which farmers were protected from invol-
untary bankruptcy liquidations.253 In his introductory statement Rep-
resentative Rodino commented on the poor farm economy, the
inability of farmers to have a chapter 11 plan approved, the inability of
most family farmers to qualify for chapter 13 protection, the vulnera-
bility of chapter 11 farm debtors to creditor's liquidating plans, and the
likelihood that most farmers seeking to reorganize in bankruptcy
would likely end up in liquidation.2 54
H.R. 1399, the Family Farmer Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1985, in-
troduced by Representative Synar, was similar in most respects to
H.R. 1397, except that it dealt exclusively with chapter 13. To qualify
as a family farmer for chapter 13, a person would have had to receive
more than 50% of his gross income from farming.255 An incorporated
family farm could qualify as such if the majority of the shares was
owned by the farm family (including relatives) and the stock was not
publicly traded.256 Family farmers would have been eligible for chap-
ter 13 if their debts did not exceed $1 million.257 Family farmers
would have had up to ten years to complete their chapter 13 reorgani-
zation plan.258 The chapter 13 cramdown provision would have re-
quired (1) the secured claimant to retain the lien and receive the
liquidated value of its claim, (2) the lien to attach to sale proceeds if
the collateral was sold, or (3) the secured claimant to realize the indu-
bitable equivalent of its claim,259 similar to chapter 11. Family farmer
payments on a chapter 13 plan would have been required to begin
within 270 days after the plan was filed, rather than the standard 30
days.26 0 In his introductory comments Representative Synar stated
that the purpose of his bill was "to give family farmers facing bank-
ruptcy a fighting chance to reorganize their debts and keep their land.
The bill offers family farmers the important protection from creditors
that bankruptcy provides while, at the same time, ensuring that farm
lenders-rural banks, the Farmers Home Administration, farm imple-
ment dealers, seed companies and others-receive a fair repay-
252. H.R. 1397 § 3, 99th Cong., 1st. Sess. (1985).
253. Id. § 1(a). The bill would not have applied to existing bankruptcy cases. Id. sec. 7.
254. 131 CONG.REc. E778-79 (daily ed. March 5, 1985).
255. H.R. 1399 § 2, 99th Cong., 1st. Sess. (1985).
256. Id.
257. Id. § 3. Residential mortgages on family farms would have been excluded from
the section 1322 requirement that residential mortgages not be modified in chap-
ter 13. Id. § 4(b).
258. Id. § 4(c).
259. Id. § 4(d)(5).
260. Id. § 4(e). See supra note 251. The bill would not have applied to existing bank-
ruptcy cases. Id. § 6.
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ment."261  Representative Synar commented at length on the
economic difficulties farmers were facing as a result of the poor farm
economy and the legal difficulties farmers encountered in attempting
to have a chapter 11 reorganization plan confirmed, particularly their
vulnerability to creditor's liquidating plans.262
The two bills were combined into a new bill, H.R. 2211, introduced
by Representatives Rodino, Synar, and others on April 24, 1985. H.R.
2211 as introduced would have affected farm reorganizations in chap-
ters 11 and 13. The minimum percentage farm income test in the fam-
ily farmer definition was dropped in favor of a farm debt
requirement: at least 80% of the farmer's debt would have had to be
related to the farming operation.263 Family farmers would have been
eligible for chapter 13 if they had regular annual income and their
debts did not exceed $1 million.264 A chapter 13 trustee's fees in fam-
ily farmer cases would have been limited to up to 10% of the first
$450,000 in plan payments, and up to 3% thereafter. 265 Farm mort-
gages including the farmstead mortgage could have been rewritten,
and family farmer chapter 13 plans could not extend beyond seven
years.26 6 Payments on a family farmer chapter 13 plan could, in the
court's discretion, have begun later than usual 30 days after the plan
was filed.267 The exclusive period in which the debtor may file a chap-
ter 11 reorganization plan would have been extended for farmers from
180 days to 240 days, while the exclusive period for the debtor to ob-
tain plan approval would have been extended for farmers from 180
days to 300 days.26s Family farmers would also have been exempt
from involuntary bankruptcies. 269
The combined bill was reported out of the Judiciary Committee on
June 20, 1985 with few changes. The committee report added a re-
quirement for incorporated family farms which stated that at least
half the stock be held by the farm family and that the stock not be
261. 131 CONG.REc. E777 (daily ed. Mar 5, 1985)(statement of Rep. Synar).
262. Id. Rep. Synar also mistakenly asserted that only one percent of all operating
farmers were immune from involuntary bankruptcy, citing an unnamed U.S. De-
partment of Agriculture study concluding that only the top 1% of agricultural
producers earned more than 70% of their income from farming. Id. Apparently
the U.S.D.A. report referred to farmers's net income, whereas the involuntary
bankruptcy protection test is a gross income test, not a net income test. Cf. 11
U.S.C. § 303(a). If section 303(a) were a net income test Rep. Synar would have
been correct in asserting that only few farmers would qualify for immunity from
involuntary bankruptcies.
263. H.R. 2211, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1 (1985).
264. Id. § 2(2).
265. Id. § 5(a).
266. Id. § 7(b).
267. Id. § 8.
268. Id. § 4(a).
269. Id. § 3. The bill would not have applied to existing bankruptcy cases. Id. at § 10.
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publicly traded.270 The maximum period of time for a family farmer
chapter 13 plan was changed from seven to ten years to allow for
greater repayment of unsecured claims.271 In the floor debate Repre-
sentative Williams recounted how farmers who had been encouraged
by federal agricultural officials and farm lenders to expand their op-
erations during the 1960s and 1970s were now facing financial ruin be-
cause they had followed such advice, and then encountered low crop
prices, high interest rates, and falling land values. 272 Representative
Synar acknowledged that the bill would not solve the farm crisis, and
would only help those family farmers with sufficient financial vitality
able to successfully reorganize under the new bankruptcy provi-
sions.2 73 Representative Synar also suggested that the bill would ben-
efit farm lenders as they would receive more under a successful
reorganization than they would under liquidation.274 Representative
Moorhead quoted hearings testimony to the effect that a longer period
for family farmer chapter 13 plans would increase repayment of un-
secured creditors,275 while the longer period for filing a family farm
chapter 11 plan would allow debtors to more accurately evaluate the
results of the next harvest.2 76 The committee bill was passed by the
House on June 24, 1985.277
H.R. 2211 would have provided substantial bankruptcy relief to
family farmers. The absence of the chapter 11 elements styming farm
reorganizations-the adequate protection requirement, creditor ap-
proval of the farm reorganization plan, and the absolute priority
rule-would have significantly enhanced the possibility of a successful
farm reorganization. At the same time, the extended ten year period
for a family farmer chapter 13 reorganization plan would have in-
creased the eventual recovery of unsecured claimants to the extent
farmers realized disposable income, balancing somewhat the signifi-
cant advantages afforded to family farmers at the expense of their
creditors. However, the possibility of the chapter 13 family farmer
debtor receiving either a hardship discharge or a super discharge sug-
gested that creditors would have run the significant risk of not receiv-
ing the liquidated value of their claims, let alone any additional
270. H.R. Rep. No. 178 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, reprinted in June 18.1(a) Bankr. L. Rep.
CCCH No. 152 (June 27, 1985).
271. Id. § 7(b). See, 131 CoNG.REc. H4770 (daily ed. June 24, 1985) (statement of Rep.
Moorhead).
272. 131 CONG. REc. H4774-75 (daily ed. June 24, 1985) (Statement of Rep. Williams).
273. Id. at H4769.
274. Id. at H4470. Presumably this assertion took into account the expanded payments
to unsecured claimants that would occur with a ten year family farmer chapter 13
plan.
275. Id. One bankruptcy judge suggested that higher repayment of unsecured debts
would allow family farmers to retain more dignity and self respect. Id.
276. Id. at H4771.
277. Id. at H4775.
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repayment. Therefore, despite the ten year term of the family farmer
chapter 13 plan, creditors would have run a substantial risk of receiv-
ing less then they would have in immediate liquidation.
In the Senate, Senator Grassley introduced S. 2249, the Family
Farm Reorganization Act of 1986, on March 26, 1986.278 The bill pro-
posed a new chapter 12 of the Bankruptcy Code which combined ele-
ments of chapter 11 and chapter 13. Family farmer eligibility
requirements were similar to those of H.R. 2211 except that the debt
ceiling was increased from $1 million to $1.5 million.279 A trustee
would be appointed for all chapter 12 cases similar to chapter 13.280
The farm debtor would operate the farm as a debtor in possession with
authorities similar to a chapter 11 debtor in possession.28 ' A creditor's
committee would have been established similar to chapter 11 with
similar authorities.28 2 The debtor in possession would have been re-
moved on the same general bases as a chapter 11 debtor in posses-
sion.28 3 The chapter 12 debtor would have had an exclusive right to
file a reorganization plan within 240 days after filing, with an addi-
tional 60 days to have the plan approved by creditors.28 4 The proposed
confirmation standard was similar to chapter 11.285 The bill's chapter
12 adequate protection requirements were significantly different from
those of chapter 11. Section 361, including the indubitable equivalent
requirement, would not have applied in the proposed chapter 12. In-
stead, reasonable customary rental payments would have been re-
quired for use of farmland, in addition to the chapter 11 periodic cash
payments, replacement liens, and other relief.28 6 Farmland or farm
equipment could have been sold by the trustee free of creditors's inter-
ests.28 7 A special provision would have allowed obtaining credit on an
expedited basis to provide emergency livestock care.2s s The new chap-
ter 12 would have had a five year life.28 9 In his introductory remarks
278. Cosponsors included the late Sen. Zorinsky of Nebraska. Other Senate farm
bankruptcy proposals included S. 1342, and S. 1516. See 132 CONG.REC. S5556
(daily ed. May 7, 1986).
279. S. 2249 99th Cong., 2d Sess. § 2 (1986) (proposed § 1201).
280. Id. (proposed § 1203).
281. Id. (proposed §§ 1204, 1205).
282. Id. (proposed §§ 1206, 1207).
283. Id. (proposed § 1209).
284. Id. (proposed § 1211). Creditors could have filed a plan if the debtor were re-
moved as debtor in possession, if the debtor in possession did not file a plan
within 240 days, or did not have the plan approved by creditors. Id. The contents
of the debtor's plan would have been similar to those of a chapter 11 plan. Id.
(proposed § 1211). A disclosure statement, creditor solicitation, and creditor vot-
ing would have been required similar to chapter 11. Id. (proposed § 1212).
285. Id. (proposed §§ 1216-18).
286. Id. (proposed § 1222).
287. Id. (proposed §§ 1223).
288. Id. (proposed § 1225).
289. Id. § 6.
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Senator Grassley noted that the bill would eliminate the need for
farmers to provide creditors with lost opportunity cost, and that the
farmland adequate protection requirements reflected what creditors
would realistically have received if they had foreclosed on the farm-
land.290 Senator Grassley also acknowledged that the proposed chap-
ter 12 would not solve the farm crisis, but stated that the current
bankruptcy statutes inhibited farmer reorganizations.
S. 2249 was subsequently added as an amendment to S. 1923, a bill
to increase the number of bankruptcy judgeships. 291 In proposing the
amendment Senator Grassley noted that the proposed chapter 12
would have four significant differences relative to chapter 11: modified
adequate protection requirements, authorized sales free of liens, elimi-
nation of the absolute priority rule, and extention of the time for filing
a debtor's plan of reorganization. 292 The Senate adopted an amend-
ment offered by Senator McConnell which added a 50% farm income
requirement for family farmers.2 93 Senator Grassley noted a change
he made to his amendment from its original introduction which would
require chapter 12 debtors to make periodic reports during the period
the debtor in possession is preparing his reorganization plan.294 Sena-
tor Helms voiced the only opposition to the new chapter 12 in the rec-
ord of the legislative debate, stating that it would result in reduced
credit to farmers.295 Senator Harkin voiced support for chapter 12,
but expressed concerns regarding the five year sunset provision and
the chapter 12 creditor's committee.296
The Conference Committee adopted the Senate version with modi-
fications.297 The creditor's committee provisions were deleted, the pe-
riod for filing a chapter 12 reorganization plan was reduced from 240
to 90 days, the confirmation hearing was required to be held within 45
days of plan submission, and the sunset provision was increased from
five to seven years. The Conferees stated that the purpose of the bill
was "to give family farmers facing bankruptcy a fighting chance to
reorganize their debts and keep their land. The bill offers family
farmers the important protection that bankruptcy provides while, at
the same time, preventing abuse of the system and ensuring that farm
290. 132 CONG.REC. S3529 (daily ed. Mar 26, 1986) (Statement of Sen. Grassley). Sen.
Grassley argued that if the lender had foreclosed on the land it would have bid
the debt at the foreclosure sale, obtained the land, probably would not have been
able to sell the land, and thus could only rent it.
291. Id. at S5619 (daily ed. May 8, 1986).
292. Id. at S5555-56 (daily ed. May 7 1986) (Statement of Sen. Grassley). An analysis of
the amendment is contained at id. at S5556-58.
293. Id. at S5613-15 (daily ed. May 8, 1986).
294. Id. at S5614 (Statement of Sen. Grassley).
295. Id. at S5618 (Statement of Sen. Helms).
296. Id. at S5618-19 (Statement of Sen Harkin).
297. See Conference Report of H.R. 5316, 132 CONG.REc. H8986, H8991-94 (daily ed.
Oct. 2, 1986).
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lenders receive fair repayment."298 The Conference Report Joint Ex-
planatory Statement stated that farmers had found chapter 11 reorga-
nizations unworkable, and that farmer reorganizations would be
easier to accomplish under chapter 12.299 The Joint Explanatory
Statement stated that there was intended to be no routine conversion
of chapter 11 or 13 cases to chapter 12, but that bankruptcy courts
would in their discretion authorize such conversions on a case by case
basis. It was stated that in making that determination the court should
consider the likelihood of a successful chapter 12 reorganization. 300
The Joint Explanatory Statement also noted the substantial changes
in adequate protection requirements.
In the House debate on the Conference Report Representative
Synar stated that the new chapter 12 would give farmers the same
opportunity to reorganize in bankruptcy that individuals and small
businesses already had. This would benefit creditors, who would re-
cover more than they would in liquidation, while other farmers who
would be protected from a further decline in land values resulting
from additional foreclosures. 301 In the Senate Senator Thurmond
stated that chapter 12 is intended to help those farmers with true po-
tential to reorganize and yet allow such farmers to make reasonable
payments to creditors given the current agricultural situation. The
conferees intended chapter 12 to maintain a balance between farm
debtors and creditors. Senator Thurmond warned that bankruptcy
courts should strive to maintain equity between debtors and creditors,
realizing the possible harm to creditors of providing financial relief to
farmers. Senator Thurmond also stated that Congress should move
quickly to correct serious problems in chapter 12 if they developed,
including a possible repeal before the seven year sunset.30 2 A letter
from the American Banking Association stated that the Association
withdrew its objections to the chapter 12 because of the additional
bankruptcy judges the bill would authorize, the 90 day requirement
for filing a reorganization plan, the seven year sunset provision, and
the assurance that any major inequities would be addressed in the fol-
lowing Congress. 303 Senator Grassley's statement focused on the
298. Id. at H8999. Cf. Rep. Synar's statement supra note 263.
299. Id. at H8998-99.
300. Id. at H8999. Other considerations favoring conversion included whether the
bankruptcy petition was recently filed but no further action was taken. Consider-
ations against allowing conversion included whether a reorganization plan has
been filed or confirmed, or whether the parties had substantially relied on pre-
chapter 12 law. Id.
301. 132 CONG.REC. H9001 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1986). These statements ignore that se-
cured claimants may lose in chapter 12 if the reorganization is ultimately unsuc-
cessful and collateral values decline after plan confirmation.
302. Id. at S15075 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1986).
303. Id.
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speed with which chapter 12 cases would be required to proceed.304
Senator Deconcini, while supporting chapter 12, correctly suggested
that it could work a hardship on agricultural lenders to write off debt
with no opportunity under the section 111(b) election to recover the
deficiencies when the farm crisis ends and asset values recover. Sena-
tor Deconcini suggested that any farmer with an undersecured loan
would take advantage of chapter 12's debt write down provisions, re-
gardless of his financial status.3 0 5 Senator Deconcini argued that the
provisions favoring farm debtors would reduce the likelihood of vol-
untary workouts in favor of chapter 12.306 The Senator suggested that
the effects of chapter 12 be closely monitored and that any inequities
be promptly remedied.
The Conference Report was adopted by the House on October 2,
1986, and the Senate the following day.3 0 7 The bill was signed by Pres-
ident Reagan on October 27, 1986.308
V. CHAPTER 12309
Chapter 12 allows qualifying family farmers an attractive opportu-
nity to reorganize their finances. Insolvent debtors can reduce debt to
the value of their nonexempt assets. High interest rates may be re-
duced to market levels. Secured debt may be restructured over a
longer period of time, lowering payment requirements. A chapter 12
debtor is subject to the best interests of creditor rule, but is not subject
to the absolute priority rule or the section 1111(b)(2) election and en-
joys more lenient adequate protection requirements. Chapter 12 is a
short proceeding, which will shorten most farm bankruptcy proceed-
ings. However, the short time period, which may be as short as 45 days
for the well prepared chapter 12 debtor, give creditors little time to
respond or marshall their case. This may hamper creditors in ob-
jecting to asset valuation, reorganization plans and debt discharge, as
304. Id. at S15075-76 (Statement of Sen. Grassley).
305. Id. at S15092. However, debt can be written down only to the extent that the
farmer is actually insolvent. Thus a solvent farmer cannot write down debt in
chapter 12 even though a particular loan may be undersecured. See infra text
accompanying notes 479-86.
306. 132 CONG. REC. S15092 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1986). This argument ignores the strong
tradition of self reliance and nearly universal farmer aversion to bankruptcy. If
anything chapter 12 has increased the possibility of debt workouts by making
lenders more willing to accept debt write downs than they were when the
farmer's only reorganization option was chapter 11. See infra § VI.
307. 132 CONG.REC. H9002; (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1986); id (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1986).
308. Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees, and Family Farmers Bankruptcy Act
of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-554, 100 Stat. 3088 (1986).
309. Regarding chapter 12, see Wilson, Chapter 12: Family Farm Reorganization, 8
J.AGRIc. TAx'N & L. 299 (1987); Armstrong, The Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act
of 1986: An Analysisfor Farm Lenders, 104 BANKING L.J. 189 (1987); J. Anderson
& J. Morris, supra note 6.
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well as pursuing preferences and fraudulent conveyances. While
chapter 12 debtors must devote all disposable income to repayment of
objecting unsecured claim holders, creditors will be required to care-
fully monitor the debtor's income and expenditures to insure compli-
ance with this requirement. Most insolvent farmers will be required
to pay unsecured claim holders little, if anything, in chapter 12, per-
haps hampering their chances for needed post-confirmation credit.
While the best interests of creditors test insures in theory that credi-
tors will receive at least the liquidated value of their claim, secured
claimants will ultimately lose if the reorganization attempt is unsuc-
cessful and collateral values decline after confirmation. Because of
the advantages it provides qualifying farm debtors, chapter 12 may re-
sult in more voluntary farm debt workouts.
A. Eligibility.
Chapter 12 is available only to family farmers with regular annual
income.3 10 Individuals, including spouses, are family farmers if they
are engaged in a farming operation with aggregate debts of up to $1.5
million, 80% of which arises from the farming operation, and if at least
50% of their gross income for the prior taxable year is from farm-
ing.311 A corporation or partnership qualifies as a family farmer if at
least 50% of its outstanding stock or equity owned by a single family, it
is engaged in a farming operation conducted by a family member, it
has aggregate debts of up to $1.5 million, at least 80% of which arises
from the farming operation, at least 80% of its assets relate to the
farming operation, and any corporate stock is not publicly traded.312
Corporate or partnership family farmers are not subject to the 50%
gross farm income requirement. 313 Family farmers are exempted
310. 11 U.S.C.A. § 109(f) (West Supp. 1987). A family farmer with regular annual in-
come is defined as one whose income is sufficiently stable and regular to enable
the family farmer to make payments under a chapter 12 plan. Id. § 101(18).
311. Id. § 101(17)(A). The debt on the family farmer's principal residence is excluded
from the 80% farm debt limitation unless such debt arises from the farming oper-
ation. Id; In re Henderson Ranches, 75 Bankr. 225 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1987). The
$1.5 million debt limitation is as of the date the bankruptcy petition is filed. 11
U.S.C.A. § 101(17)(A) (West Supp. 1987); In re Labig, 74 Bankr. 507 (Bankr. S.D.
Ohio 1987). See also Matter of Rinker, 75 Bankr. 65 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 1987).
312. 11 U.S.C.A. § 101(17)(B) (West Supp. 1987). The debt on the family's principal
residence is excluded from the $1.5 million limitation unless such debt arises
from the farming operation. Id.
313. One court has declined to address the constitutionality of not establishing a 50%
gross income test for family farm corporations or partnerships as not constituting
a "core" bankruptcy proceeding. In re Lawless, 74 Bankr. 54 (Bankr. W.D. Mo.
1987). Regarding core bankruptcy proceedings see 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2); Marrion,
Core Proceedings and the "New" Bankruptcy Jurisdiction, 35 DEPAUL L.REV. 675
(1987).
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from involuntary chapter 7 or 11 bankruptcy cases.3 1 4
Because chapter 12 offers farm debtors significant advantages over
chapter 11, litigation is likely regarding whether farm debtors in fact
qualify for chapter 12. One issue already raised is whether a debtor is
engaged in farming. Farming is not defined by the Code, but a farm-
ing operation "includes farming, tillage of the soil, dairy farming,
ranching production or raising of crops, poultry or livestock, and pro-
duction of poultry, or livestock products in an unmanufactured
state." 315 Section 109(f) does not specify when the debtor must be
engaged in farming in order to qualify for chapter 12. Some bank-
ruptcy courts have held the farming requirement must be met when
the chapter 12 petition is filed.316 This is likely to be an issue where
the debtor either has rented out the farm, probably because of inabil-
ity of obtain operating financing, or where the debtor is liquidating.
Thus far the cases indicate that the farmer is not engaged in farming
in either case. 31 7 Given the congressional intent to help farmers stay
on the farm, this interpretation seems appropriate.3 18
A related issue is whether at least 50% of the farmer's gross income
is farm income. Thus far bankruptcy courts are divided regarding
whether cash rent income is farm income, although the Bankruptcy
Court for the District of Nebraska has ruled in the negative.3 19 In-
come sources (other than direct farm earnings) which have qualified
as farm income include the sale of farm equipment and land,320 cattle
hauling for other farmers,3 21 and federal farm program payments.32 2
An individual retirement account distribution has been determined to
constitute non-farm income, even though the IRA was funded with
farm earnings. 323 Courts have split regarding whether income tax
principles should govern in determining whether income is farm in-
314. 11 U.S.C.A. § 303(a) (West Supp. 1987).
315. Id. § 101(20).
316. In re Labig, 74 Bankr. 507 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1987); In re Tim Wargo & Songs,
Inc., 74 Bankr. 469 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1987); In re Mikkelsen Farms, Inc., 74
Bankr. 280 (Bankr. D. Or. 1987); In re Tart, 73 Bankr. 78 (Bankr. E.D. N.C. 1987).
317. In re Labig, 74 Bankr. 507 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1987); In re Tim Wargo & Sons, Inc.,
74 Bankr. 469 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1987) (landlord not engaged in farming); In re
Mikkelsen Farms, Inc., 74 Bankr. 280 (Bankr. D. Or. 1987) (landlord not engaged
in farming); In re Tart, 73 Bankr. 78, 80 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1987).
318. 132 CONG.REc. H8999 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1986).
319. In re Haschke, 77 Bankr. 223 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1987), citing Matter of Armstrong,
812 F.2d 1024 (7th Cir. 1987); In re Mary Freese Farms, Inc., 73 Bankr. 508
(Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1987); In re Welch, 74 Bankr. 401,404 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1987);
Contra In re Rott, 73 Bankr. 366 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1987).
320. In re Shepherd, 75 Bankr. 501 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987); In re Rott, 73 Bankr. 366
(Bankr. D.N.D. 1987); In re Armstrong, 812 F.2d 1024 (7th Cir. 1987).
321. In re Guinnane, 73 Bankr. 129 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1987).
322. In re Shepherd, 75 Bankr. 501 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987).
323. In re Nelson, 73 Bankr. 363 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1987).
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come for purposes of chapter 12.324 One may expect amended tax re-
turns and similar prefiling activity as farm debtors seek to restructure
their income to qualify for chapter 12. Whether such activities will be
successful remains to be seen.
Finally, some of the early chapter 12 litigation has addressed the
$1.5 million debt limitation. In In re Johnson the bankruptcy court
ruled that spouses could not simply sever joint debts to avoid the $1.5
million debt limitation in order to qualify for separate chapter 12
cases. 325 In In re Labig, the bankruptcy court ruled that an assignee's
postpetition willingness to forego claims against the farm debtor
could not be used to reduce debtor's indebtedness below the $1.5 mil-
lion limit.326 Similarly, future litigation can be expected as to whether
prepetition debt repayment to qualify for chapter 12 constitutes a pref-
erence or bad faith filing.
B. Conversion or Dismissal.
Bankruptcy cases filed after November 26, 1986 may be converted
to chapter 12.327 Whether bankruptcy cases filed before chapter 12's
effective date may be similarly converted is unclear, and has gener-
ated most of the early chapter 12 litigation. Section 302(c)(1) of the
1986 bankruptcy act states that the chapter 12 amendments do not ap-
ply to cases filed before the act's effective date of November 26, 1986.
However, the legislative history clearly indicates that the conferees
intended bankruptcy courts to allow conversion of existing farm bank-
ruptcy cases to chapter 12 in their equitable discretion.328 The failure
of the statute to comport with the legislative history is doubtless a
drafting error which will prevent many family farmers from con-
verting their existing bankruptcy case to chapter 12. Of the reported
cases, a majority do not allow conversion 29 while a substantial minor-
324. Court will not look behind filed income tax return regarding the 50% gross farm
income requirement. In re Nelson, 73 Bankr. 363, 365 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1987).
Contra, In re Rott, 73 Bankr. 366 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1987) (debt forgiveness income
not included in gross income calculations even though constituted taxable
income).
325. 73 Bankr. 107 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1987). The court also found that the petitions
were not filed in good faith and did not allow conversion to chapter 11.
326. 74 Bankr. 507 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1987).
327. 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 706, 1112, 1307 (West Supp. 1987). To convert from chapter 11 to
chapter 12 the conversion must be equitable. Id. § 1112(d)(3). The motion to con-
vert must include the debtor's proposed chapter 12 plan. Local R. Bankr. 12-1(2)
(D. Neb., proposed Nov. 26, 1986).
328. See text accompanying note 300, supra.
329. In re Solomon, 72 Bankr. 506 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1987); In re Keinath Bros. Dairy
Farm, 71 Bankr. 993 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1987); In re Evans, 72 Bankr. 21 (Bankr.
D. Or. 1987); In re Rossman, 70 Bankr. 985 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1987) In re Mc-
Donald, 72 Bankr. 227 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1987); In re Ray, 70 Bankr. 431 (Bankr. E.D.
Mo. 1987); In re Hughes, 70 Bankr. 66 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1987); In re Glazier, 69
[Vol. 66:632
FAMILY FARMER BANKRUPTCY
ity do.330 The first district court opinion on the issue follows the mi-
nority approach.3 3 ' While the Bankruptcy Court for the District of
Nebraska has not directly ruled on the issue, it has allowed a chapter
13 debtor to file a chapter 12 case and then to dismiss its chapter 13
case.3 32 The interim chapter 12 rules for the District of Nebraska
treat a motion to convert a pre-chapter 12 farm bankruptcy case to a
new chapter 12 case as a motion to dismiss,333 inviting the debtor to
file a new chapter 12.
The debtor may convert the chapter 12 case to a chapter 7 case at
any time.334 The debtor might elect to do so if his liquidation analysis
indicated that reorganization was not financially feasible.335 If a case
has not already been converted from chapter 7 or 11 to chapter 12, the
debtor may at any time request the court to dismiss the case.3 3 6 The
court may dismiss a chapter 12 case for a variety of reasons, including
the debtor's unreasonable delay or gross mismanagement prejudicial
to creditors,3 3 7 failure to timely file a reorganization plan,3 3 8 failure to
make timely payments or material default under a confirmed plan,3 3 9
denial of confirmation and denial of the time to file an additional
plan,3 4 0 revocation of confirmation and the debtor's failure to obtain
Bankr. 666 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1987); In re Lindsey, 69 Bankr. 632 (Bankr. C.D.
Ill. 1987); In re Barclay, 69 Bankr. 552 (Bankr. C.D. 111. 1987); In re Spears, 69
Bankr. 511 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 1987); In re Litteral, 74 Bankr. 14 (Bankr. W.D. La.
1987); In re Petty, 69 Bankr. 412 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1987); In re Albertson, 68
Bankr. 1017 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1987); In re Groth, 69 Bankr. 90 (Bankr. D. Minn.
1987); In re Fischer, 72 Bankr. 634 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1987); In re Council, 70 Bankr.
20 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1987); In re B.A.V., Inc., 68 Bankr. 411 (Bankr. D. Colo.
1986); In re Tomlin Farms, Inc. 68 Bankr. 41 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1986); In re Calif.
Land & Equip. Leasing Co. Inc., 72 Bankr. 1 (Bankr. E.D. Calif. 1984).
330. In re Nelson, 73 Bankr. 363 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1987); In re Gamble, 72 Bankr. 75
(Bankr. D. Idaho 1987); In re Orr, 71 Bankr. 639 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1987); In re
Anderson, 70 Bankr. 883 (Bankr. D. Utah 1987); In re Woloschaak Farms, 70
Bankr. 498 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987); In re Mason, 70 Bankr. 753 (Bankr.
W.D.N.Y. 1987); In re Henderson, 69 Bankr. 982 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1987); In re Big
Dry Angus Ranch, Inc., 69 Bankr. 695 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1987); In re Fischer, 72
Bankr. 634 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1987); In re Erickson Partnership, 68 Bankr. 819
(Bankr. D.S.D. 1987), affd 74 Bankr. 670 (S.D.S.D. 1987); accord J. Anderson & J.
Morris, supra note 6, §§ 3.09 at 3-45 to - 54.
331. In re Erickson Partnership, 74 Bankr. 670 (S.D.S.D. 1987), affV 68 Bankr. 819
(Bankr. D.S.D. 1987).
332. In re Frederick, BK87-898 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1987) Accord In re Woloschaak
Farms, 70 Bankr. 498 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987); In re Gamble, 72 Bankr. 75
(Bankr. D. Idaho 1987).
333. Local R. Bankr. 12-1(1) (D. Neb., proposed Nov. 26, 1986).
334. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1208(a) (West Supp. 1987).
335. See text accompanying notes 475-84, infra.
336. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1208(b) (West Supp. 1987).
337. Id. § 1208(c)(1).
338. Id. § 1208(c)(3).
339. Id. §§ 1208(c)(4), 1208(c)6).
340. Id. § 1208(c)(5).
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confirmation of a modified plan,341 and continuing loss or diminution
of the estate and lack of a reasonable likelihood of rehabilitation.342
The court may dismiss or convert to chapter 7 if the debtor has com-
mitted fraud in connection with the case.343
There is no specific provision authorizing conversion from chapter
12 to chapter 11 or 13.344 At least one bankruptcy court has denied
conversion from chapter 12 to chapter 11.3 45
C. Case Administration.
Case administration in chapter 12 will be an interesting mixture of
chapters 11 and 13. The deadlines are short, similar to chapter 13, but
opportunities for litigation (and preconfirmation negotiation and com-
promise) abound. In most cases the short time period for filing claims,
objections, etc. and the local rules encouraging negotiation and com-
promise will minimize litigation. Where large amounts are at stake,
however, and no clear precedent has been established, litigation will
probably be undertaken.
The major items of chapter 12 case administration include the
chapter 12 trustee's authorities, the chapter 12 debtor's authorities,
and adequate protection requirements.
Filings and Notices. The chapter 12 filing fee is $200.346 Schedules
of assets, liabilities and creditors must be filed within 15 days of filing
or the case will be dismissed for cause.347 Within 10 days of filing the
schedules, the debtor must serve notice of the initial meeting of the
creditors to all parties.348 The initial notice must contain the date the
schedules were filed, the date for the meeting of the creditors (section
341 hearing), a statement that objections to discharge must be filed
within 60 days of the section 341 hearing, and a statement that creditor
claims must be filed within 30 days of the filing of the schedules. 349 If
a plan was filed with the petition, as is likely to be common practice
unless the bankruptcy petition is an emergency filing, the notice must
list the confirmation hearing date (not later than 45 days after filing
the plan350 ) and must include a copy of the plan.351 Otherwise, the
notice must include a statement that the debtor will serve all parties
341. Id. § 1208(c)(7).
342. Id. § 1208(c)(9).
343. Id. § 1208(d).
344. In re Orr, 71 Bankr. 639 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1987).
345. In re Lawless, 74 Bankr. 54-55 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1987).
346. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1930(a)(5) (West Supp 1987).
347. Local R. Bankr. 12-2(2) (D. Neb., proposed Nov. 26, 1986).
348. Id. 12-2(3). The parties include all creditors, the U.S. Attorney, the chapter 12
trustee, and any other entity requesting notice. Id.
349. Id. 12-3(1).
350. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1224 (West Supp. 1987).
351. Local R. Bankr. 12-3(1)(g) (D. Neb., proposed Nov. 26, 1986).
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with a copy of the plan when it is filed, and provide notice of the con-
firmation hearing date.
Claims and Objections. Creditors's proofs of claims must be filed
within 30 days of the order for relief if the schedules are filed with the
petition; otherwise within 45 days of the order for relief.3 52 Objections
to creditors's claims must be filed at least ten days prior to the confir-
mation hearing. Claims not timely filed will be allowed or disallowed
as shown on the debtor's schedules.
Chapter 12 Trustee. A trustee will be appointed in each chapter 12
case.353 In districts, such as Nebraska, where the U.S. Trustee system
has not yet been implemented, a standing trustee will be appointed by
the bankruptcy court.35 4 The chapter 12 trustee has many but not all
the duties of a chapter 7 or 11 trustee, including: examining and ob-
jecting to proofs of claim, opposing discharge, furnishing information
regarding the estate and estate administration to a party in interest,
and investigating the debtor's financial condition and business opera-
tion.35 5 Given the short duration of the chapter 12 case, between 45
and 135 days,356 the trustee is unlikely to have time to investigate the
debtor's farm operations except in unusual cases. The trustee must
also appear and be heard at all valuation hearings, confirmation hear-
ings, postconfirmation plan modification hearings, and sales of estate
property.357 The trustee must approve section 1206 sales of farmland
and farm equipment.3 58 The trustee will monitor the debtor's per-
formance of the plan,359 and if the debtor is removed as debtor in pos-
session, administer the property of the estate.360 However, the trustee
is not authorized to file a reorganization plan.3 61 The trustee must file
any required state or local income tax return for the estate.3 62 The
trustee's will have more of an arm's length relationship with a chapter
12 debtor than a chapter 13 debtor, similar to chapter 11.
The chapter 12 trustee's fees can significantly affect the ultimate
cost of a chapter 12 reorganization to debtors. For cases filed before
November 26, 1989 or thirty days after the U.S. trustee's program is
extended to Nebraska, the trustee is entitled to a fee of up to 10% of
352. Id. 12-4.
353. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1202(a) (West Supp. 1987).
354. A standing Chapter 12 Trustee has been appointed for the District of Nebraska.
See Local Bankr. Rules 3 (D. Neb., proposed Nov. 26, 1986).
355. 11 U.S.C.§§ 704(5)-(7), 1106(a)(3) (1982); 11 U.S.C.A. § 1202 (b)(1)-(2) (West Supp.
1987).
356. The plan must be filed within 90 days of the petition, while the confirmation
hearing must be held within 45 days of the plan's filing. Id. §§ 1221, 1224.
357. Id. § 1202(b)(3).
358. See infra note 378 and accompanying text.
359. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1202(b)(4) (West Supp. 1987).
360. Id. §§ 1202(b)(5), 1203.
361. Id. § 1221.
362. Id. § 1231(b).
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all payments made under a confirmed chapter 12 plan up to $450,000,
and 3% of all additional payments.363 When the U.S. trustee's pro-
gram is implemented in Nebraska, the chapter 12 trustee fee standard
will be the same, although such fees will be established by the U.S.
Attorney General rather than by the individual bankruptcy court.36 4
Currently U.S. trustees are charging the full 10% fee.3 65 Some debtors
have unsuccessfully sought to avoid paying trustee's fees by making
payments to secured creditors directly rather than through the
trustee.366 Until the U.S. trustee's program is implemented in Ne-
braska trustee's fees are likely to be substantially less than 10%. This
could change when the U.S. trustee program is implemented. Impos-
ing the maximum trustee's fee could significantly raise the cost of
chapter 12 to debtors, and reduce its attractiveness.
Chapter 12 Debtor. The chapter 12 debtor is a debtor in possession,
and enjoys virtually the same powers as a chapter 11 debtor in posses-
sion.367 The debtor may use, sell or lease property of the estate other
than in the ordinary course of business, 368 obtain operating credit,369
reject, affirm or assign executory contracts and unexpired leases, 370
avoid judicial liens and unperfected liens,371 avoid certain statutory
liens,372 avoid fraudulent conveyances, 37 3 avoid preferential trans-
fers,374 abandon property of the estate,375 operate the farm,376 and ex-
ercise the exclusive right to file a chapter 12 reorganization plan.377
After notice and hearing, the debtor may, with the approval of the
trustee, sell farmland or farm equipment free of liens and without
creditors's approval, although sale proceeds are subject to the lien.378
363. Id. § 1202(d)(1)(B); Pub. L. No. 94-554, §§ 302(c), 302(d)(2)(A), 302(d)(2)(B)(xi).
364. 28 U.S.C. § 586(e)(1)(B) (1982).
365. See In re Citrowske, 72 Bankr. 613, 615 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1987).
366. See Id.; In re Rott, 73 B.R. 366 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1987); In re Meyer, 73 Bankr. 457
(Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1987); In re Centineo, 4 Bankr. 654 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1980).
Trustee fees are based on plan payments, not farm income. In re Janssen
Charlais Ranch, Inc., 73 Bankr. 125 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1987).
367. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1203 (West Supp. 1987). The chapter 11 debtor in possession's au-
thorities include all those of a chapter 11 trustee. 11 U.S.C. 1107(a) (1982). Those
duties include most of the duties of a chapter 7 trustee, id. § 1106(a)(1), in addi-
tion to the general estate administration authorities granted a trustee under titles
3 and 5.
368. 11 U.S.C. § 363(b) (Supp. III 1985). If collateral is sold, the sale is subject to the
creditor's approval. Id. at § 363(f).
369. Id. § 364 (1982).
370. Id. § 365 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
371. Id. § 544 (1982).
372. Id. § 545.
373. Id. §§ 544; 548 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
374. Id. § 547 (1982).
375. Id. § 544.
376. Id. § 1203 (West Supp. 1987).
377. Id. § 1221.
378. Id. § 1206. This section authorizes the trustee to make such sales. As a practical
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This new authority to sell property free of liens allows the farmer to
downsize his operation and use the proceeds to operate, providing
lienholders with substitute collateral on a future crop.3 79
The debtor in possession may be removed for prepetition and
postpetition fraud, dishonesty, incompetence or gross management.3 8 0
In such a case the trustee may assume operation of the case, although
the more likely result is dismissal.38
Property of the Estate. Property of the estate includes postpetition
property and earnings, similar to chapter 13.382
Automatic Stay and Adequate Protection. In addition to the sec-
tion 362 automatic stay, chapter 12 establishes a special co-debtor stay
for persons guaranteeing consumer (but not business) debts.383 To use
property of the estate (including cash collateral) in preconfirmation
farming operations, the chapter 12 debtor must provide adequate pro-
tection to secured creditors. However, section 361 and its indubitable
equivalent standard do not apply in chapter 12 cases.38 4 Thus, one of
the major obstacles to successful chapter 11 farm reorganizations has
been removed from chapter 12.385 Adequate protection may be pro-
vided by making cash payments or giving a replacement lien reflecting
collateral depreciation from use,38 6 by paying customary farmland
rental payments, based on the land's rental value, net income, and
earning capacity,3 8 7 or by the court's providing such other relief as will
matter the trustee will do so only when so requested by the debtor. Thus the
practical effect of § 1206 is to authorize the debtor to sell farmland and equipment
without creditors's consent if the trustee approves.
379. This is possible because section 361 and its indubitable equivalence standard do
not apply to chapter 12. Id. at § 1205(a) See also infra text at notes 430-36.
380. Id. § 1204(a). The debtor in possession may be reinstated by the court. Id. at
§ 1204(b).
381. Id. § 1208(c)(1),(d).
382. Id. § 1207(a). Cf. id. § 1306.
383. Id. § 1201. Cf. 11 U.S.C. § 1301 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). See In re Bigtalk, 75
Bankr. 561 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1987); In re Circle Five, Inc., 75 Bankr. 686 (Bankr.
D. Idaho 1987). A chapter 12 plan proposing to release non-consumer co-debtors
could not be confirmed over creditors's objections. In re Robinson Ranch, Inc., 75
Bankr. 606 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1987).
384. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1205(a) (West Supp. 1987). Chapter 12 debtor not required to pay
postpetition interest as adequate protection to undersecured creditor. In re Ren-
nich, 70 Bankr. 69 (Bankr. D. S.D. 1987).
385. See supra text at notes 149-66.
386. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1205(b)(1)(2), (West Supp. 1987). Adequate protection is not re-
quired for real estate value declines. In re Raylyn AG Inc., 72 Bankr. 523 (Bankr.
S.D. Iowa 1987).
387. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1205(b)(3) (West Supp. 1987). Chapter 12 debtors may argue that
adequate protection payments are not required until the creditor could have ob-
tained clear title to the collateral through foreclosure, adopting the approach of
In re Ahlers, 794 F.2d 388 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 55 U.S.L.W. 3852 (1987).
See supra text accompanying notes 149-66. However the Ahlers court's reasoning
was significantly based on § 361, which does not apply to chapter 12. Thus the
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adequately protect collateral value or an ownership interest.3 88
The local bankruptcy rules for the District of Nebraska encourage
negotiation and settlement of adequate protection disputes. Creditors
who have farmland for collateral and request relief from the auto-
matic stay must state whether the parties have an agreement from the
farm debtor agreeing to pay 1205(b)(3) fair rental value, whether the
debtor's offer is inadequate, the position of the parties relative to the
motion, and a statement that the parties have been unable to reach an
agreement or compromise.3 8 9 If the collateral at issue is personal
property, the creditor's motion must specify the contacts the creditor
made with debtor's counsel regarding adequate protection, any offer of
adequate protection made by the debtor, the reason such offer was re-
jected, and the creditor's demand of adequate protection with justifica-
tion.39 0 In either case no relief from the stay shall be granted if the
creditor has failed to attempt to resolve the matter with debtor's coun-
sel prior to the hearing.3 91
D. Chapter 12 Farm Reorganization Plan Requirements
The chapter 12 plan is the heart of the chapter 12 reorganization.
In the plan the insolvent debtor can write down debt to the value of
assets (net of exemptions), discharging loan deficiencies. Debt repay-
ment can be extended, and high interest rates can be reduced to cur-
rent market levels. After acquired property clauses generally are cut
off in bankruptcy, giving the farm debtor an opportunity to use future
crops to finance current operations or repay other creditors. Default
can be cured and foreclosures avoided. For many farmers the reduced
debt may make the operation financially viable.
The purpose of chapter 12, like chapter 13, is confirmation of a re-
organization plan. Creditors do not vote on a plan, and a reorganiza-
tion plan can be crammed down dissenting creditors. The 1111(b)
election is not available, nor is the absolute priority rule, making a
confirmable farm reorganization plan the rule rather than the
exception.
Despite the many advantages provided debtors in chapter 12, credi-
tors are still able to object to asset valuation, interest rates, repayment
terms, and plan feasibility. Thus, preconfirmation negotiation and liti-
gation will be the norm. The short time available to creditors to op-
pose a plan, however, means that strategies that are successful in
Ahlers' rationale regarding when adequate protection payments are required may
not apply in chapter 12.
388. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1205(b)(4) (West Supp. 1987).
389. Local R. Bankr. 12-7(1) (D. Neb., proposed Nov. 26, 1986).
390. Id. at 12-7(2).
391. Id. at 12-7(3). The motion will be heard on the affidavits and argument of counsel
only. Id.
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chapter 11 will not necessarily succeed in chapter 12. This section will
examine the formal requirements, including confirmation require-
ments, for a chapter 12 plan. The next section will analyze the consid-
erations for formulating an acceptable chapter 12 plan which meets
these requirements.
Plan Filing. The debtor has the exclusive right to file a chapter 12
plan; neither creditors nor the trustee can do so.392 The plan must be
filed within 90 days of the petition unless time is extended by the
court.3 93 Most plans will be filed with the petition to shorten the pe-
riod of the bankruptcy proceeding. Failure to file a timely plan is
grounds for dismissal.394
Plan Contents. The chapter 12 plan has mandatory and discretion-
ary components, and is modeled after the chapter 13 plan content re-
quirements.3 9 5 The plan must provide for the submission of all or as
much of debtor's future earnings and income to the trustee as is
needed to implement the plan.3 96 All priority claims must be paid in
full either in cash or in deferred payments unless the holder agrees to
a different treatment.3 9 7 If the plan classifies claims each claim in a
particular class must be the same unless a claim holder agrees to less
favorable treatment.398 In addition to these mandatory provisions, the
plan may contain other discretionary provisions which provide the
real reorganization opportunities. The plan may modify the rights of
secured and unsecured claims, which provides the opportunity to re-
duce loan balances due, as well as to modify loan terms, substitute col-
lateral, etc.399 The plan may provide for the curing or waiving of any
392. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1221 (West Supp. 1987).
393. Filing plan one day late excused by court where there was no intent by the debtor
to delay the proceedings. In re Raylyn AG, Inc., 72 Bankr. 523 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa
1987).
394. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1208(c)(3) (West Supp. 1987); In re Lawless, 74 Bankr. 54 (Bankr.
W.D. Mo. 1987).
395. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1222 (West Supp. 1987). Cf. id. at § 1322.
396. Id. § 1222(a)(1).
397. Id. § 1222(a)(2). See supra text accompanying notes 76-79. Administrative ex-
penses may be paid on deferred basis, in contrast to chapter 11, where administra-
tive expenses must be paid in full on the effect date of the plan. In re Citrowske,
72 Bankr. 613, 617 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1987).
398. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1222(a)(3) (West Supp. 1987) A bankruptcy court had occasion to
discuss the nature of claim classification in a chapter 12 case that apparently was
debtor counsel's first bankruptcy case. The court stated that (1) claims in the
same class should be substantially similar, (2) secured claims are almost never
substantially similar and should be in separate classes, (3) secured and unsecured
claims should be segregated into separate classes, even if the creditor is the same,
and (4) unsecured creditors have special objection rights, and segregation of a
claim into secured and unsecured components is not a mere formality. In re Ci-
trowske, 72 Bankr. 613, 616 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1987).
399. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1222(b)(2) (West Supp. 1987). In In re O'Farrell, 74 Bankr. 421
(Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1987) the court approved a plan with a mortgage with the re-
payment term rewritten to 30 years.
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prepetition default,400 including default on long term debt exceeding
the term of the plan,401 giving the debtor the opportunity to decelerate
any accelerated loans. Unsecured claims may be paid concurrently
with secured claims, allowing unsecured claimants to receive some
payment before secured claimants have been paid in full.402 The plan
may provide for the assumption, rejection, or assignment of any exec-
utory contract or unexpired lease. 403 This is in addition to the section
1203 authority to do so as a debtor in possession. The plan may pro-
vide for payment of all or part of a claim with property of the estate,
including exempt property.404 The plan may provide for the sale of
property of the estate or the distribution of property of the estate, 405
which would allow downsizing the farming operation as part of the
plan. Secured claims may be paid over a longer period than the period
of the plan.406 This allows debtors to reamortize secured long and me-
dium term debt over longer periods, reducing payment requirements.
The plan may provide for vesting of the property of the estate in the
debtor or other entity at confirmation or at a later time (e.g. regarding
long term debt).407 Finally, any other provision not inconsistent with
the Code may be included in a reorganization plan, giving full rein to
the ingenuity of counsel in developing creative financing alternatives
and compromises.408 The latter provision might allow, e.g. payment
of interest only for a term and then payment of interest and principle
when priority claims have been satisfied; or repayment over a thirty
year reamortization schedule with a five year balloon payment. The
plan cannot exceed three years (except for payments on long term se-
cured debt), although the court may approve a plan of up to five
years.409
Plan Confirmation Criteria. The plan must comply with all provi-
sions of chapter 12 and all applicable provisions of the Bankruptcy
Code.4 10 This includes the section 1222(a) mandatory plan content
400. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1222(b)(3) (West Supp. 1987).
401. Id. § 1222(b)(5). Default may be cured within a reasonable time under the plan.
Id.
402. Id. § 1222(b)(4); 5 W. COLLIER, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1222.03 at 1222-4 (15th
Ed. 1987).
403. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1222(b)(6) (West Supp. 1987).
404. Id. § 1222(b)(7). In In re Massengill, 73 Bankr. 1008, 1013 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1987)
the court approved debtor's returning Production Credit Association stock and
Federal Land Bank stock to the PCA and Land Bank, respectively, over their
objection in partial payment at face value.
405. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1222(b)(8) (West Supp. 1987).
406. Id. § 1222(b)(9).
407. Id. § 1222(b)(10).
408. Id. § 1222(b)(11).
409. Id. § 1222(c). No separate motion is needed to have a five year term approved; it
is merely part of confirmation process. In re Citrowske, 72 Bankr. 613, 617
(Bankr. D. Minn. 1987).
410. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1225(a)(1) (West Supp. 1987).
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requirements. The debtor must have paid the chapter 12 filing fee
plus any amounts required in the plan to have been paid prior to con-
firmation.411 The plan must have been proposed in good faith, an is-
sue that is likely to result in substantial chapter 12 litigation.412 In an
early chapter 12 case the bankruptcy court ruled that there is no good
faith requirement that nondischargeable debts be treated differently
under the plan. Instead, if the creditor is successful in objecting to
discharge, the debt is not discharged as per section 1228(a). 413 In the
first chapter 12 bankruptcy court decision in the District of Nebraska
on good faith, the court ruled that income froni a $138,000 exempt an-
nuity must be devoted to the chapter 12 plan to meet the section
1225(a)(4) good faith requirement.414 Zero payment plans, i.e. plans
proposing to make no payment to unsecured creditors are likely to be
found not in bad faith, so long as the debtor proposes to distribute all
disposable income (if any) to unsecured claimants for the term of the
plan.415
The plan must propose to distribute to unsecured claimants at least
the liquidated value of their claim as of the date of confirmation, i.e.,
at least the amount unsecured claimants would have received in chap-
ter 7 liquidation.416 This familiar best interests of creditors test is a
common feature of reorganization bankruptcy, and is the reason that a
liquidation analysis is a common feature of chapter 12 bankruptcy
planning.417 The debtor has three options regarding treatment of se-
cured claims under the chapter 12 plan. First, the secured holder may
accept the plan, i.e., accept its treatment under the plan.41s Alterna-
tively, the debtor may turn the collateral over to the secured claim
holder.419 The cramdown alternative is that the dissenting secured
claim holder retains its lien, and the value of the property to be dis-
411. Id. at § 1225(a)(2); 28 U.S.C.A. § 1930(a)(5) (West Supp. 1987) See 5 W. COLLIER,
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY q 1225.02, at 1225-3 (15th ed. 1987).
412. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1225(a)(3) (West Supp. 1987). Regarding good faith litigation in
chapters 11 and 13, see 5 W. COLLIER, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY l 1129.02[3],
1325.04 (15th ed. 1987).
413. In re Citrowske, 72 Bankr. 613, 617 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1987). The court noted that
the automatic stay preludes creditors from pursuing a non,dischargeable claim.
However, once the plan has been completed and a discharge entered, the auto-
matic stay is terminated and the creditor may then legally pursue its nondis-
chargeable claim. Id. at 618.
414. In re McKeag, 77 Bankr. 716 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1987). Now annuity exemptions are
limited to $10,000. NEH.REV.STAT. § 44-371(2) (Supp. 1987).
415. This approach has been followed in chapter 13 cases. A chapter 13 plan to pay
only 18% of disposable income to creditors was not proposed in good faith. In re
Faust, 12 Bankr. 679, 681 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1981). Cf. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1225(b)(1)(B)
(West Supp. 1987).
416. Id. § 1225(a)(4) (West Supp. 1987).
417. Cf. id. at §§ 1124(3)(A), 1325(a)(4), 1325(a)(5)(B).
418. Id. § 1225(a)(5)(A).
419. Id. § 1225(a)(5)(C).
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tributed to the secured claim holder (including deferred payments) is
the allowed amount of the claim.420 This is likely to be the most fre-
quently litigated issue in chapter 12 cases, and deserves additional dis-
cussion. The major issues include realty collateral valuation, adequate
protection of personalty collateral, and the appropriate interest rate.
The issue with the greatest potential for disagreement and litiga-
tion is farmland valuation under the plan. Farmland is likely to con-
stitute the majority of the farmer's assets and loan collateral.42 ' The
higher the valuation, the greater portion of an undersecured lender's
claim will be secured and the smaller proportion unsecured. 42 2 The
higher the valuation the higher the debt repayment requirements in
the typical chapter 12 case, and the reduced likelihood that the plan
will be financially feasible. Debtors then will prefer lower valuations
while secured creditors will prefer higher valuations. The official val-
uation date is the effective date of the plan,42 3 although most valua-
tions will be conducted prior to that time. In the first reported
chapter 12 case considering the problems of valuing farm real estate
relative to plan confirmation, the bankruptcy court refused to limit
itself to a consideration of the farmland's rental value despite Con-
gress' use of rental value in section 1205 adequate protection determi-
nations. 424 The court also considered comparable sales and capitalized
income. The bankruptcy court for the district of Nebraska has fol-
lowed a capitalized earnings test rather than a comparable sales test,
although generalizing from only one case may be inappropriate. 42 5
Any outstanding real estate taxes would be subtracted from the value
of an undersecured lender's claim as a prior lien,426 as would any prop-
erty exemption.4 27
The local bankruptcy rules for the District of Nebraska will en-
courage compromise of differences in farmland valuation. The rules
state that objections to real estate valuation will not be sustained un-
less the objecting party has consulted with a pro se debtor or debtor's
counsel regarding valuation.428 The objecting party's motion must in-
clude an affidavit stating that the parties are unable to reach a valua-
tion compromise, provide the parties' respective good faith estimates
420. Id. §§ 1225(a)(5)(B), 1222(b)(9).
421. See infra note 7.
422. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1982).
423. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1225(a)(5)(B)(ii) (West Supp. 1987) See In re Statmore, 22 Bankr. 37
(Bankr. D. Neb. 1982). Other things being equal, a court is likely to favor a later
property valuation.
424. In re Beyer, 72 Bankr. 525, 527-28 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1987).
425. In re McKeag, 77 Bankr. 716 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1987).
426. In re Edwardson, 74 Bankr. 831, 835 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1987). Cf. NEB.REv.STAT.
§ 77-203 (1986).
427. In re Brown, 22 Bankr. 363 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1982). See supra text accompanying
notes 44-54.
428. LoCAL R. BANKR. 12-5(1) (D. Neb., proposed Nov. 26, 1986).
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of value, and state whether either estimates are supported by a quali-
fied appraisal conducted within 90 days of filing the affidavit. The
costs of any hearing on objections to the plan may be taxed "propor-
tionate to the value determined at said hearing."429 This last provision
should help keep the parties' farmland valuations more realistic.
Where collateral is personal property rather than realty, an impor-
tant issue is whether an after acquired property clause has been cut off
by the bankruptcy petition. The automatic stay does not cut off an
after acquired property clause in postpetition proceeds, offspring,
rents or profits.430 Thus, if the collateral is farm equipment, the after
acquired property clause in the security agreement would be cut off
except with regards to proceeds. With regard to annual crops, the af-
ter acquired property clause is cut off with regard to crops planted
after the petition was filed, but crops planted prepetition are subject to
the security interest even if they are harvested postpetition unless the
court orders otherwise.431 Regarding perennial crops, all postpetition
crops are subject to the prepetition security interest after acquired
property clause,43 2 as are postpetition livestock offspring.433 The live-
stock issue was considered in an early chapter 12 decision of the bank-
ruptcy court for the District of Nebraska regarding plan confirmation.
The debtor proposed to sell feeder pigs and cull sows in the ordinary
course of business and sell them free of the creditor's security inter-
est.4 34 The creditor objected on the basis that this would violate its
section 552 postpetition security interest, which it is would be allowed
to retain under section 1225(a)(5)(B)(i). 435 The court analyzed these
sections, and correctly concluded that if it prohibited livestock opera-
tors from selling offspring it would doom any such farm reorganiza-
tion plans. Thus, the court allowed the debtor to sell postpetition
livestock offspring in order to fund its chapter 12 plan so long as it
adequately protected the creditor's prepetition security interest by
maintaining the hog herd at 110% of the remaining balance of the
creditor's secured claim.436 As the loan balance is reduced, the size of
herd subject to lien would be reduced accordingly.
The final issue regarding treatment of secured claims under the
chapter 12 plan is the appropriate interest rate for deferred payments.
Creditors are entitled to the present value of their secured claim,
429. Id. 12-5(5).
430. 11 U.S.C. 552(b) (Supp. III 1985).
431. See Kunkel et al., supra note 39.
432. In re Beck, 61 Bankr. 671 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1985).
433. In re Wobig, 73 Bankr. 292 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1987).
434. Id. at 293.
435. Id. at 293-94.
436. Id. at 294-95. The court also required that the debtor pay any disposable income
to unsecured claims for at least three years, and that the unsecured portion of the
creditor's livestock lien not be discharged for that three year period. Id. at 295-96.
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which includes interest if the claim is not immediately paid in full.437
The appropriate interest rate to apply in the chapter 12 cramdown has
already been established by the bankruptcy court for the District of
Nebraska. In In re Wichmann the court ruled that the appropriate
market interest rate is the treasury bond yield with a remaining ma-
turity equal to the average loan amount outstanding plus a 2% risk
factor.438 The court in Wichmann followed In re Doud,439 the first
reported chapter 12 decision dealing with the appropriate chapter 12
interest rate in some detail. The Doud court noted the different ap-
proaches followed in determining the appropriate interest rate, and
stated that the Eight Circuit has adopted a market interest rate stan-
dard.440 In implementing this market interest rate approach, the
Doud court used treasury bonds as the appropriate measure of an in-
terest rate free of risk.441 The court selected treasury bonds over
treasury bills used by other courts because treasury bond terms can be
matched to chapter 12 repayment terms, whereas treasury bills have a
52 week term. Selecting the appropriate term for a treasury bond re-
quires some special calculations. Interest on treasury bills is not paid
until the end of the treasury bond term, whereas interest and princi-
pal on a debt would be paid at least annually. To compensate for this
difference the Doud court matched the average percentage outstand-
ing during the repayment period of the chapter 12 debt with the treas-
ury bond term.442 This may be best illustrated by an example. If the
debt is $12,000 to be repaid in six equal annual principal payments of
$2,000, the average balance due equals $7,000. This is the total of the
annual loan balances ($12,000 + $10,000 + $8000 + $6000 + $4000 +
$2000 = $42,000) divided by the loan term of six years ($42,000/6 =
$7000). The average balance due divided by the total balance due is
$7000/12,000 or 58.33%. Thus, the treasury bond term will be 58.33%
of the bankruptcy debt six year repayment period or three and one
437. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1225(a)(5)((B)(ii) (West Supp. 1987). See 5 W. COLLIER, COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY 1 1129.03, at 1129-62 (15th ed. 1986); Carbiener, Present Value in
Bankruptcy: The Search For An Appropriate Cramdown Discount Rate, 32
S.D.L. REV. 42, 59-60 (1987).
438. In re Wichmann, 77 Bankr. 718 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1987).
439. In re, Doud, 74 Bankr. 865 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 1987).
440. Id. at 867, citing In re Monnier Bros., 755 F.2d 1336 (8th Cir. 1985); and United
States v. Neal Pharmacal Co., 789 F.2d 1283 (8th Cir. 1986).
441. In re Doud, 74 Bankr. 865, 868 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 1987).
442. Id. citing Carbiener, supra note 437, at 64. Carbiener gives a more precise defini-
tion: "the rate paid to the bankruptcy creditor should be based on a government
security with a duration equal to the same percentage of the repayment period as
the average percentage of the claim outstanding. For example, if the average
percentage of the creditor's claim outstanding during the repayment period is
sixty percent, and the repayment period is ten years, the discount rate should be
based on a government security with a duration of sixty percent of ten years, or
six years." Carbiener, supra note 437, at 65.
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half years.443 The Doud court added a two percent risk factor to this
basic treasury bond rate to account for reorganization risks and the
inherent risks in farming.444 The Doud court did not discuss on what
date the bond rate should be established. The bankruptcy court for
the District of Nebraska adopted the Doud analysis in Wichmann, in-
cluding the two percent risk premium.445 The court stated that it
would consider evidence regarding special circumstances rendering its
discount rate calculations inapplicable, but indicated generally that it
would follow the Doud approach.446 The Wichmann court also did
not discuss what date would be used to establish the treasury bond
rate.
The final general confirmation standard for a chapter 12 reorgani-
zation plan is a plan feasibility test, which is also likely to give rise to
significant litigation.447 Under the test, creditors will be able to chal-
lenge the financial viability of the farming operation, including the
farmer's past production record and whether the farmer's income will
fall due to scheduled farm program payment reductions.448 Interest-
ingly, the local bankruptcy rules for the District of Nebraska require
the farmer only to submit a one year cash flow plan.449 Creditors may
argue that a one year cash flow projection is inadequate where a
farmer is proposing a three to five year plan. The justification for a
one year cash flow is that annual changes in government farm pro-
grams, in addition to normal crop and livestock market fluctuations,
make precise prediction of future farm prices difficult. The counter
argument is, at least for cash grain farmers heavily dependent on farm
program payments, that a one year cash flow projection probably over-
states future farm income in light of scheduled reductions of farm pro-
gram payments.
The last special confirmation standard likely to be invoked in most
chapter 12 cases is the unsecured claim holder cramdown standard. If
either the trustee or an unsecured claim holder objects to confirma-
tion, the plan must propose either to pay all unsecured claims in full,
or else to devote all disposable income to payment of unsecured claims
during the life of the plan for a minimum of three years.45 0 Disposa-
443. Cf. In re Doud, 74 Bankr. 865, 868 nn. 1-2 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 1987). Generally
treasury bond interest rates increase with the bond term.
444. Id. at 869. Carbiener recommended a one percent risk factor. Carbiener, supra
note 437, at 65. However, the additional risk attendant in chapter 12 farm reorga-
nizations not present in the typical chapter 11 and 13 non-farm reorganizations
would seem to justify the additional risk premium.
445. In re Wichmann, 77 Bankr. 718 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1987).
446. Id. at 722.
447. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1225(a)(6) (West Supp. 1987). See In re Monnier Bros., 755 F.2d 1336
(8th Cir. 1985).
448. See supra text accompanying note 2.
449. LOCAL R. BANKR. 12-6(1)(b) (D. Neb., proposed Nov. 26, 1986).
450. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1225(b)(1) (West Supp. 1987). Although the statute does not so
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ble income is income received by the debtor less reasonably necessary
family support and reasonably necessary expenses to continue, pre-
serve and operate the debtor's business.451 As most chapter 12 debtors
are likely to be insolvent, and as unsecured claim holders are likely to
object to plan confirmation, a standard feature of the typical chapter
12 plan will be to pay all disposable income to unsecured claim holders
for three years or any longer plan term.452
The local bankruptcy rules for the District of Nebraska suggest
some further chapter 12 plan confirmation requirements. The plan
must include (1) a summary of the debtor's assets and liabilities; (2) a
one year cash flow projection including all income sources and the as-
sumptions upon which the income projection is based; (3) the histori-
cal or other data justifying the cash flow assumptions (i.e. prior farm
production and marketing records); (4) farm income and expense in-
formation for the last four years;453 (5) projected administrative ex-
penses, including attorney fees; (6) schedules showing the dates and
amounts of payments to be made, including those outside the plan; (7)
the tax consequences of any sale of assets;45 4 (8) the basis for property
valuations, including a statement of whether the debtor's valuation
varies from the creditor's valuation; (9) a justification for any payment
of secured debts over a term exceeding three years; and (10) an
itemization, valuation, and basis therefor of any encumbered property
proposed to be retained by the debtor.455
The debtor may modify the plan prior to confirmation. 456 This
would allow the debtor, inter alia, to modify the plan to reflect negoti-
ations with creditors. If the plan is confirmed by the bankruptcy
court, it is binding on the debtor and all creditors, even if the creditor
is not provided for in the plan, or has rejected the plan.457 If the plan
is not confirmed, at least one court has ruled that the debtor may file
a new plan.458 Confirmation may be revoked for fraud if a creditor
objects within 180 days of confirmation.459 All property of the estate
state, the clear intent is that disposable income be paid to unsecured claim hold-
ers. In re Citrowske, 72 Bankr. 613, 616 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1987).
451. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1225(b)(2) (West Supp. 1987).
452. See In re Wobig, 73 Bankr. 292, 295-96 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1987).
453. The rules suggest that the information could be taken from the schedule F from
the farmer's last four federal income tax returns. LOCAL R. BANKR. 12-6(1)(d)
(D. Neb., proposed Nov. 26, 1986).
454. Taxes from the sale of appreciated assets must be paid by the debtor, whereas
income resulting from debt discharge is not taxable. See supra text accompany-
ing notes 91-95.
455. LOCAL R. BANKR. 12-6(1) (D. Neb., proposed Nov. 26, 1986).
456. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1223 (West Supp. 1987).
457. Id. § 1227(a).
458. In re Bentson, 74 Bankr. 56, 58 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1987).
459. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1230(a) (West Supp. 1987). The court may dismiss the case pursuant
to section 1208 (erroneously referred to in section 1230(b) as section 1207) unless
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vests in the debtor upon confirmation except as otherwise provided in
the plan or confirmation order.460 The property vests free of credi-
tor's claims except for debts not discharged, or as otherwise provided
in the plan or confirmation order.461 The chapter 12 discharge is re-
ceived when all payments under the plan are completed, except for
payments exceeding the term of the plan.462 Debts not discharged in-
clude those for which no proof of claim was filed,463 long term debts
being repaid over a period longer than the period of the plan,464 and
debts defined by the Code as nondischargeable.465 A hardship dis-
charge may be granted by the court if the debtor is unable to make
plan payments and if such failure is beyond the debtor's control, credi-
tors have received at least the liquidation value of their claim, and
postconfirmation plan modification is not practicable.466 A creditor
may object to discharge on the basis of the debtor's fraud if the credi-
tor did not know of such fraud until after discharge was granted.467
An additional confirmation issue that may result in litigation is
postconfirmation modification of the chapter 12 plan. After confirma-
tion but before payments have been completed, the plan may be modi-
fied to increase or decrease payments on claims of a particular class,
extend or reduce the time of such payments (subject to the five year
plan term limitation), or alter the distribution to a particular creditor
based on payments made outside the plan if such modification is re-
quested by the debtor, trustee, or unsecured claim holder.468 Ander-
son and Morris suggest several circumstances that might lead to
postconfirmation plan modification.46 9 If the debtor's income is less
than expected, the debtor could petition the court to reduce payments
to unsecured claim holders. If the debtor's income increased or the
debtor obtained additional assets, unsecured claim holders could peti-
tion the court for increased payments during the life of the plan. If
the debtor were unable to make payments on secured claims, the
debtor could petition the court to modify the plan or surrender the
the debtor proposes to modify the plan and the modified plan is confirmed. Id.
§ 1230(b).
460. Id. § 1227(b).
461. Id. § 1227(c).
462. Id. § 1228(a).
463. Id. §§ 1228(a)(1); 523(a)(3).
464. Id. §§ 1228(a)(1), 1222(b)(5), (10) (West Supp. 1987).
465. Id. § 1228(a)(2); 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). Regarding nondis-
chargeable debts, see supra text accompanying notes 83-90.
466. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1228(b) (West Supp. 1987).
467. Id. § 1228(d).
468. Id. § 1229(a),(c). Payments outside the plan could include payments by third par-
ties (e.g., relatives or guarantors). J. ANDERSON & J. MoRRis, supra note 6, § 9.03,
at 9-11.
469. J. ANDERSON & J. MoRRis, supra note 6, § 9.03, at 9-11 to 9-13.
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collateral to the secured claim holder.470 The modified plan may dis-
tribute to unsecured claim holders less than the liquidated value of
their claim.471 Anderson and Morris take a contrary position, arguing
that unsecured holders must receive the liquidated value of their
claims, citing the section 1228(b) hardship discharge requirements. 472
However, the postconfirmation plan modification confirmation re-
quirements omit the section 1225(b) unsecured holder cramdown cri-
terion. This suggests that a section 1228(a) regular discharge could be
obtained under the modified plan without obtaining a section 1225(b)
hardship discharge. The postconfirmation plan modification becomes
the plan unless disapproved by the court.473 Thus, the modified plan
would be the plan under which the debtor would be required to make
all plan payments to receive a section 1225(a) discharge.
One issue which individuals who are counselling debtors consider-
ing chapter 12 should be aware of is the effect of an unsuccessful chap-
ter 12 on subsequent bankruptcies, particularly a subsequent chapter
7. An earlier chapter 12 discharge does not bar a subsequent chapter 7
discharge within six years of the commencement of the chapter 12
case, if the debtor paid 100% of the unsecured claims; or if the debtor
paid 70% of the unsecured claims, the plan was proposed in good faith,
and was the debtor's best effort.474 This provision has different effects
depending on whether the plan failed, or whether the debtor is unable
to pay long term secured debts after the plan has been completed and
discharge has been granted. If the plan fails before it has been com-
pleted, generally the debtor will have received no debt discharge (un-
less debts were discharged in the plan). If there was no debt discharge
there is no bar to a chapter 7 discharge. If, however, the plan has been
completed and discharge has occurred, the debtor could qualify for a
subsequent chapter 7 discharge only if the debtor has paid all un-
secured claims or met the section 727(a)(9) best efforts discharge test.
In most cases the chapter 12 discharge would have discharged much if
not all of the debt exceeding current asset values. Thus, the inability
of the unsuccessful chapter 12 debtor to repay long term debt would
probably not result in the high income taxes that would have occurred
in the absence of a bankruptcy liquidation or debt discharge. If the
debtor cannot meet one of the hardship discharge requirements, the
debtor will be denied a chapter 7 discharge for six years after the
chapter 12 petition was filed. The undischarged debts remaining at
470. Note, however, that secured claimants may not petition the court for postcon-
firmation plan modification. An interesting, and to this point unanswered, ques-
tion is whether a undersecured creditor may petition the court as an unsecured
holder for modification of the plan's treatment of its secured claim.
471. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1229(b)(1) (West Supp. 1987). Cf. id. at § 1225(b).
472. J. ANDERSON & J. MORRIS, supra note 6, § 9.03, at 9-12 to 9-13.
473. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1229(b) (West Supp. 1987).
474. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(9)(1982).
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this point, aside from nondischargeable debts, would be the long-term
secured debts (but not the loan deficiencies). As these debts are likely
to constitute most of the chapter 12 debtor's remaining debts, those
debts would not be discharged in a subsequent chapter 11. Assuming
the unsecured loan deficiencies have been discharged, little debt for-
giveness income would be realized in a subsequent non-bankruptcy
liquidation. Thus, most chapter 12 debtors will not be significantly pe-
nalized if they fail to qualify for a subsequent chapter 7 bankruptcy,
absent special considerations.
E. Chapter 12 Plan Preparation
This section deals with the two most important elements of the
chapter 12 plan: debt writedown and postpetition financing.475 After
the assets and liabilities have been scheduled, the most important part
of the plan will be a liquidation analysis, i.e. an analysis of the value of
each claim as if the farmer were liquidated in chapter 7 rather than
reorganized in chapter 12. The initial liquidation analysis will indicate
whether reorganization is feasible or not. In simple terms, insolvent
debtors will be able to write debt down to the value of their assets, less
any exemptions. If the debtor needs further debt writedown to make
his reorganization feasible, he probably will not be able to have his
plan confirmed. From the creditor's perspective, the liquidation anal-
ysis depends on whether the creditor is oversecured, undersecured,
priority, or unsecured.
Secured claims. If the creditor is oversecured it will receive full
payment under the chapter 12 plan. It will also receive interest at the
contract rate up to the date of confirmation, and at the market rate
approved in the plan thereafter.476 The loan term may be extended
under the plan to help the debtor's cash flow position, although any
disposable income will in virtually every case be paid to unsecured
claim holders. The equity cushion in collateral pledged to an over-
secured creditor is the value that will be applied against unsecured
claims, as discussed below. If the creditor is undersecured, it will have
two claims, secured and unsecured. Property valuation will be critical
as it will determine how much of the creditor's claim is secured and
how much is unsecured.4 77 Secured claims must be paid in full
whereas in many cases unsecured claims will receive little or no pay-
ment. Normally each secured creditor, whether oversecured or un-
dersecured, will be placed in a separate class in the plan.
475. For a sample chapter 12 plan, see J. ANDERSON & J. MORRIS, supra note 6, at F-94
-153.
476. In re Lenz, 74 Bankr. 413 (Bankr. C.D. Iii. 1987).
477. Property is valued for purposes of § 1225(a)(5)(B) plan confirmation as of the
effective date of the plan. In re Mikkelsen Farms, Inc., 74 Bankr. 280, 289 (Bankr.
D. Or. 1987).
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Unsecured claims. The plan must deal with all unsecured claims,
including those of unsecured creditors and the deficiency claims of se-
cured creditors. The debtor can place consumer claims into a separate
category and propose a different treatment of those claims.478 A more
significant issue is whether the debtor's plan can discriminate in favor
of creditors essential to the debtor's future operations. In In re Wobig
the bankruptcy court for the District of Nebraska approved the spe-
cial treatment of "necessary creditors" without discussion, suggesting
that the court is at least receptive to this approach.47 9 The limits to
which chapter 12 debtors may go in proposing special treatment for
necessary creditors has not yet been established.
The minimum required payment to unsecured claim holders is the
liquidated value of their claim. There are two possible sources of
value in the farm assets that must be paid out to unsecured claim hold-
ers: unencumbered nonexempt assets and any equity in encumbered
nonexempt assets.48 0 Unsecured claim holders then have an interest
in asset valuation similar to that of secured claim holders: the higher
the asset valuation, the higher the liquidation value of unsecured
claims is likely to be. If the chapter 12 debtor is insolvent, has no
unencumbered nonexempt property, and has no equity in encumbered
property, the liquidated value of unsecured claims will be zero. Many,
if not most, chapter 12 plans will be "zero plans" in that unsecured
claims will have no liquidation value and the plan will propose no
payment to unsecured claim holders. In such a case the court is likely
to require that all disposable income be paid against unsecured claims
for three years, assuming that either the trustee or an unsecured cred-
itor objects to confirmation. Chapter 12 plans may propose to pay the
three year's disposable income to unsecured claim holders even if the
claims have no liquidated value to speed confirmation. In this regard
an issue likely to be litigated is how disposable income is calculated.
In an early chapter 12 case one court has ruled that the inclusion of a
"reserve account" in the farm budget (probably similar to a deprecia-
tion expense) was a reasonable business expense and did not violate
the section 1225(b)(2)(B) disposable income requirement.48 1 In that
case unsecured creditors were paid in full; a different result might
have obtained if the plan had been a zero plan.
Operating financing. An important component of the reorganiza-
tion plan is operating financing. In most cases unsold crops or live-
stock and government farm program payments will constitute the
478. 11 U.s.c. § 1222(b)(1).
479. 73 Bankr. 292, 293 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1987).
480. Recall that oversecured creditors are entitled to postpetition interest up to confir-
mation. See supra text accompanying notes 31-32. Thus any equity in encumbered
assets must be in excess of these required interest payments.
481. In re Janssen Charolais Ranch, Inc., 73 Bankr. 125, 128 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1987).
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bulk of the debtor's cash collateral. Typically, the debtor will propose
to use cash collateral as operating capital and offer replacement liens
in future crops, program payments, etc.48 2 A major issue will be the
validity of prepetition after acquired property clauses. Crops planted
postpetition are clearly not subject to prepetition after acquired prop-
erty clauses, and a debtor will be free to pledge those postpetition
crops as substitute collateral for secured debt where the collateral is
proposed to be sold to provide operating financing, or to provide collat-
eral for postpetition operating financing. For example, if the PCA has
a lien on the crop which has been harvested and stored, the debtor can
propose to sell that stored crop, use the proceeds for the next season's
operating financing, and give the PCA a lien on the future crop. Be-
cause of the uncertainty regarding a future crop, bankruptcy courts
are likely to require crop insurance as a condition of approving such
collateral substitutions.483 As the secured loan is paid down, the por-
tion of future crops that is continued to be repledged as substitute col-
lateral will decrease over time.48 4
VI. CONCLUSION
Chapter 12 has revolutionized farm bankruptcies and indirectly
farm credit workout negotiations. Prior to chapter 12, chapter 11 reor-
ganization was not a realistic option for farmers. Whether the Ahlers
decision will change this as a practical matter remains to be seen. Un-
less the farmer could qualify for chapter 13, he had little realistic like-
lihood of a successful bankruptcy reorganization. This gave lenders
little legal incentive to negotiate farm debt workouts. The farmer's
main negotiating point was the real estate mortgage foreclosure delays
and delays associated with a bankruptcy filing. However, lenders
would face the possibilities of these same delays if the workout failed,
so the threat was not that effective.
Chapter 12 has changed this by giving farmers a realistic bank-
ruptcy reorganization option. Most insolvent farmers will be able to
have a chapter 12 plan confirmed by writing debt down to asset values,
unless the farmer has a poor production history. This may make lend-
ers more willing to negotiate workouts, including accepting debt
writedowns, to avoid having to participate in bankruptcy proceedings.
Most financially troubled farmers would probably be willing to accept
workout terms less generous than they could obtain in chapter 12 sim-
ply to avoid the stigma of bankruptcy. However, some lenders may be
unwilling to negotiate workouts outside of chapter 12 because they
482. See, e.g., In re Beyer, 72 B.R. 523 (Bankr. S.D. Colo. 1987).
483. See supra text accompanying notes 172-177.
484. For a similar analysis of encumbered livestock, see supra text accompanying
notes 434-36.
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perceive it as being inequitable regarding their other farm borrowers.
If a lender's farm borrowers who are current on their loans learn of
favorable treatment given to a delinquent farmer to avoid bank-
ruptcy, the current customer may expect similar treatment and re-
quest debt writedown and reduced interest rates. The lender can save
face by in effect agreeing to a workout in chapter 12 rather than
outside of bankruptcy. Using this stategy, the lender will have had no
"choice" in the matter and will have no public relations problem with
other farm borrowers.
Will farmers in fact be able to successfully reorganize in chapter
12? The answer depends not only on how chapter 12 is interpreted
but perhaps more significantly on the weather, crop prices, the federal
farm program, and the chapter 12 debtor's management ability. The
prospect of reduced federal farm payments and the possibility of lower
crop prices resulting from biotechnological changes in agriculture do
not bode well for the highly leveraged farmer. However, chapter 12
will give insolvent farmers an opportunity to reduce their debt load
down to asset values. If these farmers can generate sufficient farm
income to service these reduced debts, many will have an opportunity
to survive in what promises to be a continually changing agricultural
economy.
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